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ABSTRACT
This paper introduces a new ‘supply-push’ instrument for foreign aid, to be used together
with an instrumental variable estimator that filters out unobserved common factors. We
use this instrument to study the eﬀects of aid on macroeconomic ratios, and especially
the ratios of consumption, investment, imports and exports to GDP. We cannot reject
the hypothesis that aid is fully absorbed rather than used to build foreign reserves or
exiting as capital flight, nor do we find evidence of Dutch Disease eﬀects. Aid leads to
higher consumption, while the evidence that it promotes investment is less robust.
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1 Introduction
Although a large literature studies the eﬀects of aid using cross-country regressions, its
problems are well-known. Researchers must contend with the endogeneity of aid, the
high persistence of output, the uncertain determinants of growth rates, nonlinear eﬀects
of aid, biases from measurement error, and the likelihood of substantial heterogeneity
in the eﬀects of aid. Moreover, since aid is given in many diﬀerent forms and with
a variety of motives, these regressions invite concerns that are not purely statistical.
For its detractors, this literature uses unreliable data to arrive at fragile answers to the
wrong question.
These criticisms may seem decisive, but some important questions are hard to answer
without cross-country data. In this paper, we seek to advance the literature in two ways.
First, we introduce a new ‘supply-push’ instrument for aid, to be used together with
an estimator that filters out unobserved common factors, even when their eﬀects diﬀer
across countries. In principle, this combination of instrument and estimator will identify
the causal eﬀect of aid under more general conditions than existing approaches. It could
be applied to a wide range of aid-related questions in future research.
Second, we shift the focus to whether and how foreign aid is absorbed by the do-
mestic economy. Aid, as a capital transfer, is not part of measured GDP. The aid could
be absorbed, by allowing increased domestic expenditure, but this is not the only possib-
ility. It might be oﬀset by a corresponding capital outflow, or used to accumulate foreign
exchange reserves. Some of the aid flows recorded by donors will not correspond to in-
ternational transfers: for example, some forms of donor-sponsored technical assistance
will not have a direct eﬀect on the recipient’s domestic expenditure. In all these cases,
aid is not absorbed by the domestic economy. For absorption to take place, domestic
expenditure must increase relative to domestic production, implying an increase in net
imports. Hence, we begin by examining the causal eﬀect of aid on net imports.
We are also interested in how absorption takes place. Absorption requires an increase
in at least one of the components of domestic final expenditure: household consumption,
government consumption, and gross investment. We study the eﬀects of aid on the
ratios of these components to GDP. This should help us to understand the potential
eﬀects of aid. For example, if aid improves the investment climate, we would expect
to see an increase in investment relative to GDP, and this has been a central concern
of the empirical aid literature since its inception. We will argue that the eﬀects of aid
on investment, and other macroeconomic ratios, are easier to study than the eﬀects on
growth. Further, in our empirical work, these eﬀects will be identified from relatively
persistent changes in aid receipts, rather than transitory and endogenous changes.
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The well-known identification problem in the cross-country literature is that aid is
not randomly assigned. To address this problem, we introduce a supply-push instrument.
It is based on the idea that the exposure of recipients to changes in donor budgets varies
across recipients. Consider two aid recipients, A and B, and a single donor. Country
A accounts for a larger share of aid from the donor, and this greater exposure persists
over time. In that case, when the donor’s budget increases for some exogenous reason,
the movement in aid is larger for country A than for country B, driven solely by the
changing supply of aid. This suggests the following instrument: we can construct a
synthetic measure of aid at each date t, based on each country’s share of aid in a donor
budget at some initial date t0, multiplied by the current donor budget at date t.
As an example, consider what happens if the British aid budget increases relative
to the French aid budget. Former British colonies are likely to see an increase in aid
received, relative to former French colonies. More generally, there will often be long-
term connections between particular donors and recipients, so that recipients are more
exposed to variation in some donor budgets than others. Our instrument uses changes
in total donor budgets, weighted by the initial shares of recipients in those budgets,
to isolate exogenous changes in aid receipts that are not driven by the conditions of
individual aid recipients. We call this a supply-push instrument; it is related to the work
of Bartik (1991) on regional economics and Card (2001) on the labor market eﬀects of
immigration. As in the immigration setting, the origins and destinations of flows of aid
are large in number, and this makes it unlikely that the instrument — as a weighted
average of many donor budgets — will be correlated with recipient-specific conditions.
We investigate this further below.
A possible objection is that donor budgets may be influenced by forces common
to many recipients. For example, world economic conditions are likely to aﬀect donor
generosity, and also the outcomes of poor countries. Drawing on recent work in the
panel time series literature, global forces can be seen as unobserved common factors with
loadings that diﬀer across countries. We filter these out using an instrumental-variable
version of a common correlated eﬀects (CCE) estimator. This class of estimators was
introduced by Pesaran (2006) and extended to instrumental variables by Harding and
Lamarche (2011). Our paper is the first to apply this approach to the study of foreign
aid. The combination of the new instrument and estimator should mean that we identify
causal eﬀects of aid under more general conditions than the existing literature.
We find that aid is at least partially absorbed, reflected in net imports. We cannot
reject the hypothesis that aid leads to a one-for-one increase in net imports, correspond-
ing to full absorption. This occurs mainly through an increase in imports rather than
a decline in exports, and hence we do not find symptoms of Dutch Disease. The find-
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ings hold across a range of estimators and robustness checks. There is similarly robust
evidence that aid leads to increases in total consumption. This appears to be driven
by increases in household consumption, but those estimates are less precise unless we
exclude outliers. The evidence that aid promotes investment is weaker. In some models,
aid has a delayed eﬀect on investment, but these results are sensitive to the estimation
method and the exclusion of outliers.
The next section will sketch possible relationships between aid and macroeconomic
ratios. Section 3 explains the approach to estimation and its relation to the literature.
Section 4 describes the data. In section 5, we analyze whether and how aid is absorbed,
and the possibility of Dutch Disease. Section 6 presents robustness checks, before
section 7 concludes. An appendix describes the CCE IV estimator.
2 Aid and macroeconomic ratios
From a national accounts perspective, foreign aid is a capital transfer which does not
contribute directly to GDP, but in principle allows an increase in domestic expenditure
on final goods and services, relative to domestic production. Alternatively, aid might
be used to accumulate foreign reserves, or lead to a capital outflow. Some aid may be
spent on consultants who work exclusively in the donor country, with no direct eﬀect on
the aid recipient’s domestic expenditure. It is therefore interesting to ask whether aid is
absorbed. Domestic absorption is typically defined as the sum of household consumption,
gross investment, and government consumption. We are interested in (1) whether aid
is reflected in higher domestic expenditure on final goods and services, and (2) which
expenditure components are most aﬀected. This helps to clarify what is at stake in the
paper. We show that aid is generally absorbed — it increases expenditure relative to
output — but also find that consumption responds more strongly than investment. We
do not uncover any symptoms of Dutch Disease. These results do not establish whether
aid is ‘eﬀective’, a hard task for a single paper, but they do contribute new evidence to
the relevant debates.
We first consider what it means for aid to be fully absorbed. Take Y as GDP,
equal to the sum of household consumption C, gross investment I, and government
consumption G, minus net imports M − X. For aid to be absorbed, at least one of
C, I or G must increase, along with their total. If they increase relative to GDP, the
GDP identity implies that the ratio of net imports to GDP, (M − X)/Y , must also
increase. There is nothing problematic about this; it is what must happen if aid permits
greater domestic expenditure relative to domestic production.1 In the short run, if aid is
1For more on absorption see Adam (2013), Aiyar and Ruthbah (2008), Berg et al. (2010), Hansen
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devoted to higher domestic expenditure on final goods and services, net imports will rise
one-for-one with aid. If the response of net imports is smaller than this, aid absorption
is only partial.
To study absorption, we take the ratios C/Y, I/Y,G/Y and (M − X)/Y as our
dependent variables. The way aid is absorbed might diﬀer between the short and the
long run. In the short run, aid might be used to build foreign exchange reserves which
are used to finance higher expenditure only later, so that full absorption is temporarily
postponed.2 More generally, the relationships between macroeconomic ratios and aid
could be complicated over longer time horizons. If aid is spent in ways that improve
the investment climate, the long-run eﬀect of aid on investment could be much larger
than the short-run eﬀect. Or consider what happens when donor funds are spent on
consultants working in the donor country: short-run absorption will be zero, but tech-
nical advice may later be reflected in economic policies and hence in macroeconomic
ratios. Our empirical analysis will distinguish between short-run and long-run eﬀects,
by estimating dynamic models, sometimes with a role for lagged aid.
The models we estimate can be related to macroeconomic theories of the aggregate
eﬀects of aid. In the one-sector Ramsey model, a permanent increase in aid raises the
investment ratio in the short run, but not the long run. Aid promotes faster convergence
to the steady-state, but the long-run levels of the capital stock and GDP are invariant
to aid (Obstfeld, 1999). Along the balanced growth path, all aid is consumed. From
a national accounts perspective, consumption is higher while investment and GDP are
unchanged, and the increase in steady-state consumption is permitted by imports of the
final good. When the ratio of aid to GDP increases permanently, the long-run C/Y and
(M −X)/Y ratios increase to the same extent, leaving the other ratios unchanged. In
a two-sector model of a small open economy, with traded and non-traded goods, the
eﬀects are more complicated. Aid may increase or decrease the long-run capital stock
and gross investment, depending on whether traded production is relatively capital-
intensive. Section B.1 of the online appendix discusses this in more detail.
Models with balanced growth paths typically imply that the long-run consumption
and investment ratios are stable functions of structural parameters. In a model with
shocks, there would be a common stochastic trend in consumption, investment and
output, while the long-run ratios would be mean stationary. The long-run ratio of
consumption to output would be linear in the ratio of aid to GDP, where the intercept
and Headey (2010) and Hussain et al. (2009).
2Berg et al. (2010) and Hussain et al. (2009) analyze these decisions in detail, emphasizing that
absorption will typically be influenced by the actions of both the fiscal authority and the central bank,
with scope for these to pull in diﬀerent directions. Rodrik (2006) discusses the welfare costs associated
with holding foreign reserves.
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depends on structural parameters and can be treated as a fixed eﬀect. By working in
terms of ratios to GDP, we stay close to these predictions and avoid the non-stationarity
that would arise with alternative explanatory variables, such as aid per capita.
One drawback is that scaling our variables by GDP risks inducing correlations
between variables that were originally unrelated. We examine this possibility in de-
tail, including the pattern of results across the diﬀerent ratios. We consistently find
eﬀects of aid on some ratios and not others, where the pattern conforms with the pre-
dictions of theoretical models, and where the eﬀect sizes have plausible magnitudes. To
generate this pattern, a story based on spurious correlations might have to be some-
what contrived. Other reasons to be wary of that explanation include additional results
from first-diﬀerenced models, and models with the dependent variable in logarithms and
which also include the logarithm of GDP as an explanatory variable.
There are some advantages to studying absorption rather than growth. First, the
relationships between macroeconomic ratios and aid intensity are more likely to be linear,
for the reasons just discussed. Second, if aid improves the conditions for domestic
investment, this eﬀect might be relatively easy to detect. If we see consumption and
investment as jump variables, they can respond quickly to changes in aid. In contrast,
GDP is a function of state variables such as the capital stock: the relevant eﬀects of
aid could take time to emerge, and empirical researchers have to contend with the high
degree of persistence of GDP. With these points in mind, it should be easier to establish
reliable findings for absorption than for growth.
Our approach allows us to make progress on some fronts, but not others. Although
our instrument has some major advantages, it would be diﬃcult for us to adapt the
current approach to allow for parameter heterogeneity or non-linearities. And given the
limitations of the available data, we cannot disaggregate aid while retaining a sample
large enough for the methods that we adopt. The estimates we obtain might be best
interpreted as the average eﬀects of typical or business-as-usual aid. The paper is
therefore complementary to previous work, given its narrower focus and the trade-oﬀs
that inevitably arise in addressing some econometric issues and not others.3
3 Methods
As we noted earlier, when studying the eﬀects of aid, a central problem is that aid is
not randomly assigned across countries. Even in a model that controls for country and
time fixed eﬀects, it is likely that aid flows and outcome variables are jointly influenced
3For discussion of econometric issues, see Roodman (2007a, 2007b) and Temple (2010); on dimin-
ishing returns to aid, see Carter et al. (2015).
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by time-varying variables that are not readily measured. To address this, we adopt a
supply-push instrument which is a weighted average of donor budgets, where the weights
are fixed over time but vary across aid recipients.
To make this more precise, we are interested in the case where a country-specific
time-varying variable Ait/Yit (aid received by country i at time t divided by GDP) is
instrumented by a synthetic predictor based on fixed shares of common aggregates, such
as donor budgets. In the case of aid with one donor, for instance, we have (ai0Dt) /Yit,
where Dt is the donor budget and ai0 is the share of recipient i in that donor’s aid
budget at time zero. In the case of two donors, we have (a1
i0
D1t + a
2
i0
D2t) /Yit, and so
on. In the general case of ND donors, the synthetic aid measure is therefore A
S
it
/Yit ≡(∑ND
d=1
ad
i0
Ddt
)
/Yit, where a
d
i0
is the share of donor d’s total aid disbursements that
recipient i receives, over an initial period that is excluded from estimation, and Ddt is
the total aid disbursement made by donor d in period t.
One advantage of the new instrument is especially worth discussion. It is likely
that much empirical work on aid conflates the eﬀects of permanent and temporary
variation, just as early work on consumption conflated the eﬀects of permanent and
transitory income (Carter, 2015). From a policy perspective, a researcher might be
more interested in determining the eﬀects of a permanent change in aid. One solution
is to use an instrument that is correlated with the permanent component and not with
the transitory component. Since our instrument is a weighted average of donor budgets,
and individual donor budgets are persistent, it should come closer than some precursors
to identifying the eﬀects of permanent changes in aid.
In using this instrument, we are assuming that the total aid budgets of most donors
are not greatly influenced by the time-varying conditions of many individual aid recipi-
ents. As background, aid flows are increasingly fragmented. The number of significant
donors has increased, and most donors provide aid to a large number of countries. This
is documented in Annen and Moers (2017), Djankov et al. (2009), Easterly (2007)
and Knack and Rahman (2007), among others. Even as early as the 1970s, the US
accounted for less than a quarter of total aid flows. According to Annen and Moers,
the average bilateral donor provided aid to about 20 recipients in 1960, rising to 87
recipients by 2011.
For identification, we rely on within-donor and within-recipient fragmentation. We
want to avoid correlations between the instrument and time-varying conditions in a
recipient country. If aid is fragmented, endogeneity will arise only when the total aid
budgets of multiple donors respond simultaneously to a recipient’s conditions, and to
a large degree. This does not seem especially plausible. Total aid budgets are likely
to emerge from a medium-run political process, and the hypothesized strong responses
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would imply greater volatility in total aid budgets than we see in the data. If aid is
not fragmented, the most serious problem for the instrument would arise when a donor
gives to a small number of recipients, and those recipients receive most of their aid from
that donor. There are few such cases in the data. The observed fragmentation suggests
that the instrument will be uncorrelated with time-varying recipient conditions in most
cases.4
To support this claim, we first look at within-donor fragmentation. We construct
Herfindahl-Hirschman (HH) indices for the 29 donors that contribute to the supply-push
instrument for at least one aid recipient in our main sample; low values correspond to
aid that is distributed across many recipients, or high fragmentation.5 Figure 1 shows
box-plots for the distribution of the HH indices across donors, for each three-year period
in our sample. If we take the box-plot for 1971-73, the upper border of the box indicates
that 75% of the donors had HH indices below about 0.30, indicating high fragmentation
even in the first period.
Reading across the figure, the long-run trend is towards greater fragmentation (lower
median HH indices). The dots indicate isolated exceptions, which relate to two minor
donors and a small number of recipients. Even the exceptions are unlikely to be a
problem, because these recipients will typically receive aid from multiple sources. Since
the instrument is a weighted average of donor budgets, this should weaken the correlation
between the instrument and recipient conditions even when a subset of the donors are
highly specialized. But to check this, in the later analysis, we will consider versions
of the instrument which exclude specialized donors. The results continue to indicate
strong eﬀects of aid on total consumption and net imports.
The high degree of within-donor fragmentation supports our approach. It suggests
that the total aid budgets of these donors are unlikely to be strongly driven by the
domestic conditions of individual recipients. We next examine within-recipient frag-
mentation. As indicated previously, this will promote identification when the value of
the supply-push instrument for a given recipient draws on aid from multiple donors. This
is because, even if some donors to a given recipient have total aid budgets which are
correlated with that country’s domestic conditions, summing over a larger set of donors
will tend to weaken the correlation between those conditions and the instrument.
Note that, for identification, it will be fragmentation within the instrument at the
recipient level that matters, rather than within a recipient’s aid. We construct HH indices
4Section B.3 of the online appendix discusses the relationship between fragmentation and identific-
ation in more detail.
5The HH indices are based on the shares of each recipient in that donor’s total aid disbursement,
ignoring a very small fraction of negative aid entries arising from the repayment of loans. The shares
are squared and summed over recipients to give an index between 0 and 1, where larger numbers
indicate low fragmentation.
7
Figure 1: Within-donor Herfindahl-Hirschman indices: distribution across donors
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Note: These are box-plots that summarize the distribution of HH indices across donors, in each sample
period, for donors that contribute to the instrument values of at least one aid recipient in our sample
in that period. The lower and upper borders of the box correspond to the 25th and 75th percentiles
respectively, and the line inside the box shows the median. Dots highlight atypical observations more
than 1.5 times the interquartile range from either the 25th or the 75th percentile. The whiskers indicate
the range for the observations excluding these dots.
for each recipient and year, based on the contribution of each donor to that recipient’s
supply-push instrument in that year. Figure 2 shows box-plots for the distributions of
these within-instrument HH indices across recipients, drawing on the 1099 recipient-
period observations in our main sample. The lines in the middle of the boxes show
the degree of fragmentation within the instrument for the median recipient: for many
recipients, the instrument is relatively fragmented, supporting identification. There are
some exceptions where recipients have HH indices close to one, and hence where the
instrument places a high weight on a single donor for that particular recipient. These
are isolated cases which are unlikely to dominate the variation, and should not threaten
identification given the within-donor fragmentation documented above.6 In summary,
the analysis suggests that a supply-push approach can be applied to the study of foreign
aid.
6Note that, for identification, dependence on a single donor is not a problem in itself. Concerns
arise when that donor gives to only a small number of recipients, since then it becomes more likely
that the donor’s total budget is endogenous to conditions in those recipients in a way that will not be
weakened by summing over donors.
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Figure 2: Within-instrument Herfindahl-Hirschman indices: distribution across recipients
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Note: The box-plots summarize the distribution of HH indices across recipients, based on within-
recipient instrument fragmentation in each period. For interpretation, see the main text and the notes
to Figure 1.
We now turn to a diﬀerent objection, which is that total aid budgets might be
influenced by disaster and emergency relief. But even broadly defined, humanitarian
assistance accounts for a small share of global aid flows: for 1995-2013, Qian (2015)
finds that it ranged between 5% and 9% of oﬃcial development aid. Some humanitarian
assistance is long-term rather than emergency-related, and several of the major recipients
are not in our data set.7 Finally, since emergency relief may be funded by reallocations
within existing budgets, and disasters do not appear to have major eﬀects on aid receipts
(Qian, 2015), we do not see strong grounds to reject the supply-push approach on this
basis.
The paper’s contribution goes beyond the supply-push instrument for aid. This is
the first paper to estimate the causal eﬀect of aid while allowing for latent common
factors with heterogeneous eﬀects, such as global economic conditions. Imagine the
7For example, Afghanistan, Haiti, Iraq, Somalia, and the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Major recip-
ients of humanitarian assistance in recent years are listed in Development Initiatives (2014); on their
definition, humanitarian aid accounted for roughly 10% of aid from OECD DAC donors in 2004-2013.
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process generating the outcome of interest Qit/Yit is given by:
Qit/Yit = β (Ait/Yit) + εit (1)
εit = λ
′
i
Ft + uit (2)
where Ft is a vector of unobserved common factors (including, say, world economic
conditions) and λi is a vector of factor loadings which may vary across countries. This
multifactor error structure nests both conventional fixed eﬀects (where one common
factor is time-invariant) and conventional time eﬀects (where loadings on one time-
varying factor are the same across countries) as special cases. The generality of this
structure has made it a focus of recent econometric research, and applications have
spanned a range of fields, as we note below.
Importantly, allowing for heterogeneous eﬀects of common factors will help to ensure
that our supply-push instrument is exogenous. In contrast, conventional panel estimators
with time fixed eﬀects assume that common factors, such as global shocks, have exactly
the same eﬀects on all the countries in the sample.8 If the data generating process is
more complicated, identification could fail, because the instrument might be correlated
with the eﬀects of the common factors. The combination of a supply-push instrument
and a flexible approach to common factors is new to this paper, and should achieve
identification under a wider range of circumstances than previous work.
We now explore this in more detail, and assume that we do not have observable
proxies for the common factors or their loadings. This means there are two possible
sources of endogeneity: aid might be correlated with the eﬀects of the omitted factors,
the λ′
i
Ft, or with the country-specific shock uit. For a fixed-eﬀects IV estimator to
be consistent, we would need our supply-push instrument AS
it
/Yit to be uncorrelated
with both, and hence with εit, at all dates. This could be questioned. For example,
donor budgets may be correlated with world economic conditions which also influence
macroeconomic ratios in individual aid recipients. In that case a supply-push instrument
could be correlated with λ′
i
Ft even when there is no correlation with uit.
To address this, we filter out common factors using the approach of Pesaran (2006).
His paper introduced common correlated eﬀects (CCE) estimators for panel data. This
class of estimators proxies for the combined eﬀects of common factors using linear
combinations of the cross-section means of the observable variables. To allow the
eﬀects of the factors to diﬀer across countries, the combinations are estimated from
8When this assumption seems too restrictive, researchers sometimes interact time dummies with a
small set of country-specific observables; Breinlich et al. (2014) call this latter approach proportional
time effects. But this is also restrictive, because it treats the unobserved factor loadings as simple in
structure and known to the researcher.
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the data and vary across countries. This is achieved by augmenting the regression with
cross-section means of the dependent variable and the explanatory variables, all with
country-specific coeﬃcients. Under a condition on the number of linearly independent
common factors, their combined eﬀect will be captured by the cross-section means.
The method thereby addresses an important class of omitted variables in a way that
is straightforward to implement. It can accommodate various forms of cross-section
dependence, and simulations suggest that it can perform well even in small samples and
when the factors are non-stationary.9
The CCE method has been extended to the case of instrumental variables by Hard-
ing and Lamarche (2011), yielding a CCE IV estimator that we describe in Appendix
A. This estimator is again easy to implement. The first and second stages of 2SLS are
augmented with cross-section means of the observable variables, including the instru-
ment, with country-specific coeﬃcients. This approach has costs and benefits. It builds
in robustness, helping to ensure that the instrument is exogenous. However, filtering
out the common factors is parameter-intensive and could ask a lot of the data. The key
point here is that, although the benefits of CCE IV may be oﬀset by higher standard
errors, our estimates are often precise enough to be informative.10 Although we report
the results from several methods, we give most emphasis to CCE IV, as the estimator
most likely to yield consistent estimates of the parameters of interest.
We now discuss how the paper relates to previous work. The instrument we adopt
was first used by Van de Sijpe (2010) to study aid and governance, but without allowing
for a multifactor error structure.11 Work using other supply-push instruments includes
Nunn and Qian (2014) and Werker et al. (2009). The instrument in the latter paper
interacts the world oil price with a dummy for Muslim countries, since aid to Muslim aid
recipients may be sensitive to the oil price. Werker et al. use this to study the eﬀects
of aid on a range of outcomes, including macroeconomic ratios. Their findings tally
closely with ours. They find a significant eﬀect of aid on consumption, where the IV
estimate is much larger; no evidence that aid leads to higher government consumption;
some evidence that aid promotes gross investment, but this is not robust; no evidence
9For references to the literature, see chapter 29 of Pesaran (2015). Other textbook presentations
include Hsiao (2014) and Söderbom et al. (2015), while previous applications include Baltagi and Li
(2014), Bond et al. (2010), Eberhardt et al. (2013), Holly et al. (2010) and Imbs et al. (2011).
10To get a sense of whether the degrees of freedom are suﬃcient for over-fitting to be avoided, the
balance of parameters and observations in our models is comparable to a hypothetical fixed eﬀects,
static panel data model with N = 350 and T = 3. See also Section B.5 of the online appendix, and
the simulation evidence in Harding and Lamarche (2011), Table 1.
11A related synthetic measure of aid, based on average shares in donor budgets rather than initial
shares, was used in Hodler and Raschky (2014). Average shares may be aﬀected by developments
within recipients, which weakens the case for exogeneity, as we discuss in Section B.2 of the online
appendix.
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that aid aﬀects exports; and strong evidence that aid leads to higher imports. Although
the two papers diﬀer in significant respects, the findings on absorption are remarkably
similar.
Our instrument can be used to study broadly-defined aid, whereas natural experi-
ments tend to be informative about narrow categories of aid. For example, the Werker
et al. findings are most informative about the eﬀects of unconditional grants from Gulf
oil exporters to Muslim aid recipients, while Nunn and Qian (2014) is focused on US
food aid, using lagged US wheat production as the supply-side push variable. Another
advantage of our approach is that we can allow for common factors. Although some
papers introduce observable proxies for λ′
i
Ft, this is necessarily restrictive. In contrast,
the CCE approach does not require either the common factors or their heterogeneous
loadings to be observable.
Our approach is related to other work on aid using instrumental variables, including
Galiani et al. (2017), Jarotschkin and Kraay (2016) and Tavares (2003). The latter paper
used the distance between recipients and donors, and whether they share a common
border, language or religion, to instrument for aid. In our study, the initial shares in
donor budgets can proxy for many possible connections between donors and recipients
while remaining agnostic about their sources. Put diﬀerently, we infer connections from
the data, rather than restricting them to take specific forms.
In summary, the combination of a supply-push instrument and the CCE IV estimator
is new to this paper. The approach has several benefits. First, by using the total aid
budgets of many donors to construct the instrument, we are exploiting the fragmentation
of global aid flows to lessen the risk that the instrument is correlated with the conditions
of individual aid recipients. This will be the case even if those conditions are driven by
country-level trends, for example. Second, we use the CCE IV approach to address a
remaining concern, that total donor budgets could be influenced by common factors,
such as world economic conditions, that are correlated with conditions in aid recipients.
The combination of instrument and estimator allows us to go beyond the natural ex-
periments studied in the literature to date, and study the eﬀects of broadly-defined aid
from a wide range of donors.
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4 Data
Our models will be estimated using three-year averages over 1971-2012.12 To construct
the synthetic aid measure that we use as an instrument, we need the initial shares of aid
recipients in donor budgets. These initial shares will be based on the period 1960-1970.
Our aid variable is taken from Table 2a of the OECD Development Assistance Com-
mittee (DAC) data tables. We follow Arndt, Jones and Tarp (2010) in our treatment of
some missing values: they argue that some apparently missing values in fact correspond
to zeroes. In each year, we turn missing recipient-donor-year aid to zero for combina-
tions of recipients that receive aid from at least one donor in that year and donors that
disburse aid to at least one recipient in that year. Aid in recipient-year format is found
by keeping the entries that list ‘All donors, total’ as a donor. Our focus is on net aid
disbursements, and our final sample comprises 88 aid recipients.
Our synthetic measure for aid is constructed from the DAC’s recipient-donor-year
data. For each donor, we calculate the average of the annual shares of a given recipient
country in a donor’s aid for the years 1960-1970 (this yields ad
i0
), and multiply this
by the donor’s current budget (Ddt, the sum of the donor’s aid disbursements over all
recipient countries in period t).13 We then sum these numbers across donors to get
AS
it
=
∑ND
d=1
ad
i0
Ddt. For each recipient country, this yields the aid that the recipient
would have received at each date, had its shares in the various donor budgets remained
constant, and hence equal to the 1960-1970 average shares. It is this time-varying,
synthetic measure of aid that we use to instrument for aid in panel data regressions.
Both the endogenous aid variable and the instrument will be measured relative to GDP.
The data on GDP and its components are taken from online World Bank data using
wbopendata (Azevedo, 2011).
The dependent variables considered will include household consumption, government
consumption, gross capital formation, imports and exports, again relative to GDP.14
Net imports are defined as imports minus exports. In the recipient-year data, before
12The cross-country literature often uses four-year or five-year averages, but those choices would
leave us with a relatively short time dimension, given that the CCE estimators require country-specific
coeﬃcients for each cross-section mean. Moving in the opposite direction, to annual data, would also
have disadvantages, given the need to estimate models with a more complicated dynamic structure.
13For a small percentage of observations, the numerator or denominator in these annual shares (aid
received by country i from donor d in each year) or the denominator (total aid disbursed by donor
d in each year) are negative. This is likely to reflect repayments of the principal of loans, which are
treated as negative flows in the net ODA data. Hence, before we calculate the annual shares, negative
values for the numerator are changed to zero, and the denominator is recalculated by summing the
non-negative numerators over all recipients.
14Since a linear combination of the ratios equals unity by construction, the model for one of the
dependent variables will be statistically redundant when the covariates are the same across regressions,
but the covariates diﬀer in the case of CCE estimation.
13
collapsing to three-year averages, observations for these variables are turned to missing
whenever at least one of the other components of the GDP identity is missing. This
keeps the sample consistent across the diﬀerent outcomes we consider. In our final
data set, the expenditure components sum to total GDP, or very close to GDP, for
each country-period observation.15 We exclude countries with populations fewer than
500,000 people in the first period of the sample. These steps leave us with a panel with
1099 observations, based on 88 countries.16
5 Results
For each dependent variable, we report eight regressions. For reference purposes, we
report FE and pooled CCE results that do not instrument for aid. We report estimates
for static models, and models that include a lagged dependent variable.17 In each case,
the coeﬃcient estimates indicate the eﬀect of the aid-to-GDP ratio on the dependent
variable, also measured as a ratio. For example, in the case of net imports, a point
estimate of one implies that the ratio of net imports to GDP increases one-for-one with
the ratio of aid to GDP, corresponding to full absorption.
The standard errors that we report are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by
country, and we make a small-sample adjustment to take into account the large number
of parameters. In experiments, we compared adjusted standard errors to those obtained
from a non-parametric block bootstrap, given that the asymptotic distribution of pooled
CCE-type estimators is non-standard (Pesaran, 2006) and the asymptotic variance of
the CCE IV estimator in Harding and Lamarche (2011) is not known. The bootstrapped
standard errors are noticeably larger than the conventional standard errors in some cases,
but our main findings obtain under either approach to inference.18
15Only one country-period observation, for Mali in 2004-6, shows a discrepancy larger than 1% of
GDP. Dropping this observation makes little diﬀerence to our results.
16These are Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Rep., Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Cuba,
Cyprus, Dem. Rep. of the Congo, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji,
Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia,
Iran, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia,
Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman,
Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rep. of the Congo, Rwanda, Saudi
Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand,
Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia,
and Zimbabwe.
17The sample for each of the eight regressions consists of the observations included in the CCE IV
estimation of the dynamic model. In our main estimates, we have 13 or 14 time series observations
for many countries, with a maximum of 14.
18In the case of CCE IV estimates, we also report bootstrapped, bias-corrected 90% confidence
intervals for the long-run eﬀect, based on the BCa method (see Davison and Hinkley, 1997, pp.
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The long-run responses of macroeconomic ratios to aid may diﬀer from those in
the short run. The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable is one way to capture this.
Whenever the estimated model is dynamic, the long-run eﬀect of aid is estimated using
the ratio of the short-run eﬀect to one minus the coeﬃcient of the lagged dependent
variable, with a standard error approximated by the delta method. Since the long-run
eﬀect is a ratio, the estimates are likely to less precise than the estimates of short-run
eﬀects.19 Dynamic models also have the drawback that CCE-type estimators will be
consistent under more restrictive assumptions than in the static case.20
With this in mind, our discussion will give more emphasis to static models; the use
of three-year averages implies that, even in these models, absorption can extend over
several years. Before we turn to the results, note that the eﬀects of instrumenting for
aid and allowing for common factors are likely to vary across the dependent variables.
Macroeconomic ratios are likely to diﬀer in their sensitivity to particular aid-relevant
shocks, and in their sensitivity to common factors.
We first study the eﬀects of aid on trade-related variables, starting with net imports.
Recall that net imports must increase if aid is absorbed. If the net import share rises
one-for-one with the aid share, this should assuage concerns that aid is diverted abroad
(capital flight), used to accumulate foreign exchange reserves, or spent on forms of
technical assistance that do not have a direct eﬀect on expenditure beyond the donor
country. The results are shown in Table 1. In our IV estimates, we cannot reject
the hypothesis that aid is fully absorbed domestically. The coeﬃcient on aid is large,
significantly diﬀerent from zero, and not significantly diﬀerent from unity, both in static
models and in the long run derived from dynamic models. Note the contrast with the
upper row of estimates: in the absence of an instrument, the evidence that aid is fully
absorbed is weaker.
We can also investigate whether there are symptoms of aid-driven Dutch Disease.
An increase in domestic expenditure will often fall partly on non-traded goods, increasing
both their relative price and the costs facing the export sector.21 Tables 2 and 3 show
the eﬀects of aid intensity on import and export shares respectively. The results for
the import share are similar to those for net imports, with the exception of the static
model estimated by FE IV. A strong positive eﬀect of aid is found in the two CCE IV
203-211) and using 1999 replications.
19As is well known, the estimation of dynamic panel data models with fixed eﬀects is subject to the
Nickell (1981) bias. That bias is typically less serious when the data span a long time, and also for a
long-run eﬀect, because the biases in the individual parameter estimates can oﬀset each other.
20See Chudik and Pesaran (2015) and Everaert and De Groote (2016). The development of estim-
ators for this case is an active area of research.
21In models in which the capital stock is endogenous, a pure transfer may have no long-run relative
price eﬀects, but exports will be lower in equilibrium, with imports partly financed by the transfer. See
Cerra et al. (2009, p. 149).
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Table 1: Aid and net imports
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FE FE CCE CCE
Aid 0.545∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.628∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.0745) (0.123) (0.117)
Lagged dep. variable 0.575∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗
(0.0399) (0.0842)
Long-run eﬀect aid 0.741∗∗∗ 0.856∗∗∗
Long-run eﬀect SE 0.167 0.200
(5) (6) (7) (8)
FE IV FE IV CCE IV CCE IV
Aid 0.772∗∗∗ 0.555∗∗∗ 1.085∗∗∗ 0.991∗∗
(0.217) (0.169) (0.285) (0.390)
Lagged dep. variable 0.548∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗
(0.0516) (0.102)
Long-run eﬀect aid 1.227∗∗∗ 1.543∗∗∗
Long-run eﬀect SE 0.289 0.513
BCa [0.73,1.86] [0.97,2.80]
First stage F-statistic 19.10 19.27 18.14 13.45
Underidentification 0.001 0.001 0.009 0.014
Note: Dependent variable is net imports. All variables measured relative to GDP. Fixed eﬀects (FE),
fixed eﬀects IV (FE IV), common correlated eﬀects (CCE) and common correlated eﬀects IV (CCE
IV) results, three-year averages, 1971-2012 (N = 88, NT = 1099). IV regressions carried out using
xtivreg2 for Stata (Schaﬀer, 2010). FE and FE IV regressions allow for country and time fixed eﬀects,
coeﬃcients not reported. Country fixed eﬀects and country-specific coeﬃcients on cross-section means
in CCE and CCE IV regressions not reported. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered by
country, in brackets. Standard errors (SE) for long-run eﬀects based on the delta method. ∗, ∗∗, and
∗ ∗ ∗ denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively. BCa shows a bias-corrected-and-accelerated
90% confidence interval from a non-parametric block bootstrap. Underidentification shows the p-value
of the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) LM test for underidentification.
regressions in particular. In contrast, we do not find a clear-cut eﬀect of aid on the
export share. In the FE IV estimates of a static model, aid has a negative eﬀect on
the export share which is significant at the 10% level, but this finding is not robust to
alternative models and estimators. In the dynamic FE IV estimates, and the two sets
of CCE IV estimates, we cannot reject the hypothesis that aid has no eﬀect on the
export share. This does not rule out Dutch Disease – that finding would require zeroes
estimated with greater precision – but nor is there robust evidence that aid adversely
aﬀects exports.22
22This is consistent with Jarotschkin and Kraay (2016), who find little evidence that aid leads to
real exchange rate appreciations. Previous evidence on aid-induced Dutch Disease is mixed. Rajan and
Subramanian (2011) use variation across sectors and countries, and find that aid lowers the relative
growth of tradable sectors. Nsor-Ambala (2015) finds less evidence of this. The review by Adam
(2013) discusses the evidence in more detail.
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Table 2: Aid and imports
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FE FE CCE CCE
Aid 0.491∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗ 0.609∗∗∗ 0.407∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.0692) (0.100) (0.0879)
Lagged dep. variable 0.682∗∗∗ 0.607∗∗∗
(0.0481) (0.0642)
Long-run eﬀect aid 1.080∗∗∗ 1.037∗∗∗
Long-run eﬀect SE 0.232 0.243
(5) (6) (7) (8)
FE IV FE IV CCE IV CCE IV
Aid 0.123 0.451∗∗∗ 0.622∗∗∗ 0.655∗∗∗
(0.336) (0.145) (0.210) (0.187)
Lagged dep. variable 0.677∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗
(0.0491) (0.0877)
Long-run eﬀect aid 1.395∗∗∗ 1.115∗∗∗
Long-run eﬀect SE 0.441 0.385
BCa [0.33,1.12] [0.54,2.39]
First stage F-statistic 19.10 21.00 29.27 19.52
Underidentification 0.001 0.001 0.019 0.006
Note: Dependent variable is imports. N = 88, NT = 1099. For other notes, see Table 1.
Next, we study how aid is absorbed. Note that, since aid leads to an increase in net
imports, the GDP identity implies that the sum of household consumption, government
consumption and total investment must have also increased. The question is whether
we can reliably identify the components of GDP which respond most strongly to aid.
We first look at the eﬀect of aid on total consumption. We define this as the sum of
household and government consumption (C + G). While household and government
consumption are distinct, there are sectors such as education and health where the
distinction is somewhat artificial for welfare purposes, given a mix of public and private
provision. The results are shown in Table 4 and suggest that aid has a large positive
eﬀect on total consumption. The diﬀerence made by instrumental variables can be
seen clearly, by comparing the upper row of estimates with the lower row. Compared
to the FE and CCE estimates, the point estimates from IV estimators suggest larger
eﬀects of aid on total consumption. We should avoid over-interpreting this, because
the diﬀerences are not statistically significant. Nevertheless, it is easy to see how this
pattern could arise. Donors may respond to country-specific adverse shocks by allocating
countries more aid, and this form of endogeneity will weaken the correlation between
aid and total consumption. By instrumenting aid we alleviate this source of bias, and
find larger eﬀects of aid.
17
Table 3: Aid and exports
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FE FE CCE CCE
Aid -0.0541 0.0852∗ 0.0396 0.0416
(0.106) (0.0465) (0.0946) (0.0805)
Lagged dep. variable 0.760∗∗∗ 0.520∗∗∗
(0.0409) (0.0537)
Long-run eﬀect aid 0.356∗ 0.0867
Long-run eﬀect SE 0.207 0.169
(5) (6) (7) (8)
FE IV FE IV CCE IV CCE IV
Aid -0.649∗ 0.0176 -0.0464 0.196
(0.357) (0.130) (0.267) (0.216)
Lagged dep. variable 0.757∗∗∗ 0.433∗∗∗
(0.0418) (0.0837)
Long-run eﬀect aid 0.0727 0.346
Long-run eﬀect SE 0.538 0.402
BCa [-0.37,0.58] [-0.31,1.21]
First stage F-statistic 19.10 18.21 30.69 30.97
Underidentification 0.001 0.001 0.018 0.012
Note: Dependent variable is exports. N = 88, NT = 1099. For other notes, see Table 1.
For the eﬀects of aid on household consumption, the estimates are generally similar
to those we find for total consumption, but less precise. These results are shown in
Table 5. The use of an instrument again increases the estimated eﬀect of aid. We
find much less evidence that aid influences government consumption, as Table 6 shows.
These results are similar to those found by Werker et al. (2009, Table 2) using a diﬀerent
instrument.
Aid has often been characterized as primarily government-to-government transfers.
Our finding that a substantial fraction of aid is reflected in higher household consump-
tion, but not in higher government consumption, may be surprising. One mechanism
could be lower taxes: increased aid to governments may not be used to increase govern-
ment purchases, but to reduce taxes (Kimbrough, 1986). Alternatively, recipient gov-
ernments may use aid to finance transfers for political ends, as in Adam and O’Connell
(1999), Boone (1996) and Hodler and Raschky (2014), among others. Finally, some
aid is given in ways which bypass domestic governments, such as oﬀ-budget aid projects
and support for NGOs.23 In these cases, household consumption is where the eﬀect of
aid is most likely to be manifested in the national accounts.
Finally, we look at the eﬀect of aid on the investment rate, in Table 7. When
23Van de Sijpe (2013) discusses oﬀ-budget aid in more detail.
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Table 4: Aid and total consumption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FE FE CCE CCE
Aid 0.391∗∗∗ 0.137∗ 0.489∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗
(0.131) (0.0764) (0.130) (0.102)
Lagged dep. variable 0.624∗∗∗ 0.516∗∗∗
(0.0341) (0.0517)
Long-run eﬀect aid 0.364∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗
Long-run eﬀect SE 0.185 0.193
(5) (6) (7) (8)
FE IV FE IV CCE IV CCE IV
Aid 0.695∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗ 0.662∗∗ 0.429∗
(0.245) (0.133) (0.284) (0.248)
Lagged dep. variable 0.606∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗
(0.0393) (0.0607)
Long-run eﬀect aid 0.690∗∗ 0.775∗
Long-run eﬀect SE 0.300 0.436
BCa [0.30,1.19] [0.24,1.61]
First stage F-statistic 19.10 18.10 19.84 12.12
Underidentification 0.001 0.001 0.010 0.007
Note: Dependent variable is total consumption, the sum of household and government consumption.
N = 88, NT = 1099. For other notes, see Table 1.
aid is instrumented, the estimated long-run eﬀect is significant at the 5% (FE IV) or
10% (CCE IV) level. But to anticipate our later discussion, the investment results are
less robust than the consumption results. Overall, our findings are in line with Boone
(1996), who finds that aid translates mainly into consumption rather than investment
and growth. Clemens et al. (2012) present stronger evidence that aid has modest
eﬀects on investment and growth, but note that their results are ‘not incompatible’
with Boone’s suggestion that aid is often consumed rather than invested. The 2SLS
estimates of Werker et al. (2009, Table 2) suggest that aid has stronger eﬀects on
consumption than investment. They find no evidence that aid aﬀects growth when
using four-year averages, which tallies with the lack of robustness of an investment
eﬀect in this paper.
Considering the magnitudes of the eﬀects, the specification allows these to be in-
terpreted easily. In Table 1, for example, a one percentage point increase in aid’s share
of GDP leads to a 0.772 percentage point increase in net imports as a share of GDP
(in FE IV estimates) or a 1.085 increase (in CCE IV estimates). Although these two
estimates are individually statistically significant, the diﬀerence between them may not
be significant. To investigate this, we use a bootstrap-based test described in Section
B.4 of the online appendix. For the results in Tables 1-7, we typically cannot reject the
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Table 5: Aid and household consumption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FE FE CCE CCE
Aid 0.337∗∗ 0.125∗ 0.381∗ 0.226∗
(0.142) (0.0694) (0.211) (0.123)
Lagged dep. variable 0.664∗∗∗ 0.535∗∗∗
(0.0282) (0.0477)
Long-run eﬀect aid 0.373∗ 0.486∗
Long-run eﬀect SE 0.197 0.264
(5) (6) (7) (8)
FE IV FE IV CCE IV CCE IV
Aid 0.844∗∗ 0.309∗ 0.708 0.462
(0.370) (0.173) (0.435) (0.358)
Lagged dep. variable 0.645∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗
(0.0330) (0.0615)
Long-run eﬀect aid 0.869∗ 0.856
Long-run eﬀect SE 0.450 0.655
BCa [0.20,1.48] [0.10,2.01]
First stage F-statistic 19.10 17.86 18.18 11.84
Underidentification 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.006
Note: Dependent variable is household consumption. N = 88, NT = 1099. For other notes, see Table
1.
null that the CCE IV point estimate is not significantly diﬀerent from the FE IV estim-
ate, given their high standard errors. In choosing between them, there is a trade-oﬀ
between robustness and eﬃciency. The CCE IV estimator should be consistent under
more general conditions than FE IV, and hence more robust, but will usually lead to
higher standard errors. Readers may legitimately diﬀer in which set of estimates they
prefer.
We have not yet discussed the strength of our instrument. The tables report the
first-stage F-statistic as a guide, indicating the significance of the single excluded in-
strument.24 This approach has been widely used, but the conventional Stock and Yogo
(2005) benchmarks for first-stage F-statistics do not apply directly to panel data mod-
els. In keeping with other papers, our application of the F-statistic in panel 2SLS is
best seen as heuristic. In most cases, and especially in the static CCE IV regressions,
the first-stage robust F-statistic is reasonably high, and the Kleibergen-Paap LM test
always rejects the null of under-identification at the 5% level.
24Note that the first-stage F-statistic diﬀers across tables for the CCE IV regressions. This is because
the CCE IV estimator includes the cross-sectional mean of the dependent variable with country-specific
coeﬃcients in both the first and second stage, so the first-stage models diﬀer across tables in this case.
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Table 6: Aid and government consumption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FE FE CCE CCE
Aid 0.0541 -0.00931 0.105 0.0836
(0.0884) (0.0406) (0.0686) (0.0695)
Lagged dep. variable 0.716∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗
(0.0325) (0.0744)
Long-run eﬀect aid -0.0328 0.146
Long-run eﬀect SE 0.144 0.120
(5) (6) (7) (8)
FE IV FE IV CCE IV CCE IV
Aid -0.149 -0.0538 -0.0583 -0.0339
(0.209) (0.0703) (0.150) (0.102)
Lagged dep. variable 0.721∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗
(0.0328) (0.0843)
Long-run eﬀect aid -0.193 -0.0566
Long-run eﬀect SE 0.260 0.172
BCa [-0.49,0.15] [-0.49,0.22]
First stage F-statistic 19.10 22.01 14.99 13.89
Underidentification 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.004
Note: Dependent variable is government consumption. N = 88, NT = 1099. For other notes, see
Table 1.
6 Robustness
We now consider several alternative models and estimators. These will tend to increase
robustness – in the sense of reducing likely biases – at the expense of reduced eﬃciency.
Our main conclusions continue to find support, even when we make adjustments to
the instrument that weaken its explanatory power in the first stage. The estimates are
summarized in Table 8, where row 1 shows the main results from Tables 1-7 for ease
of comparison. Rows 2-9 then correspond to the robustness tests listed in the notes to
the table, and that we discuss below. In each row, we report the estimated eﬀects of
aid in static and dynamic models, and the first-stage F statistics.
In our main results, we followed much of the literature and excluded countries with
small populations. If we include these countries, the instrument becomes weaker in the
first stage of 2SLS: see row 2 of the table.25 A potential explanation is that, for aid
recipients which account for small and volatile shares of donor budgets, the share of a
budget at an initial date may be uninformative about that recipient’s long-term exposure
to changes in that budget. Hence, we would expect our supply-push instrument to have
25The countries that we return to the sample are the Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan,
Comoros, Djibouti, Gambia, Kiribati, Macao, Malta, Suriname, Swaziland, Tonga, and Vanuatu.
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Table 7: Aid and gross capital formation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FE FE CCE CCE
Aid 0.154∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.123 0.172∗∗∗
(0.0580) (0.0369) (0.0749) (0.0599)
Lagged dep. variable 0.579∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗
(0.0459) (0.0584)
Long-run eﬀect aid 0.375∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗
Long-run eﬀect SE 0.110 0.125
(5) (6) (7) (8)
FE IV FE IV CCE IV CCE IV
Aid 0.0763 0.251∗∗ 0.279 0.442∗
(0.194) (0.122) (0.252) (0.237)
Lagged dep. variable 0.579∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗
(0.0474) (0.0795)
Long-run eﬀect aid 0.596∗∗ 0.700∗
Long-run eﬀect SE 0.288 0.394
BCa [0.02,0.94] [0.28,1.91]
First stage F-statistic 19.10 18.70 14.67 11.21
Underidentification 0.001 0.001 0.009 0.011
Note: Dependent variable is gross capital formation. N = 88, NT = 1099. For other notes, see Table
1.
less explanatory power for aid to smaller countries. But despite the weakening of the
instrument, the results are qualitatively unchanged.
This is also true when we exclude aid observations for colonies prior to independence,
as discussed in Section B.5 of the online appendix. Also in that appendix, we examine
whether the estimated eﬀects of aid are driven by distinct subgroups of countries, namely
economies where natural resources play a major role, and countries with unusually strong
or weak institutions. Estimates based on subsamples continue to suggest that aid
increases consumption and net imports, while the evidence that aid aﬀects investment
varies across samples. As before, aid appears to increase imports, while there is no
evidence of a negative eﬀect on exports.
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Table 8: Robustness checks
Row Model C G C+G I X M M-X
1
Static
0.708 -0.0583 0.662∗∗ 0.279 -0.0464 0.622∗∗∗ 1.085∗∗∗
(0.435) (0.150) (0.284) (0.252) (0.267) (0.210) (0.285)
F 18.18 14.99 19.84 14.67 30.69 29.27 18.14
Dyn.
0.856 -0.0566 0.775∗ 0.700∗ 0.346 1.115∗∗∗ 1.543∗∗∗
(0.655) (0.172) (0.436) (0.394) (0.402) (0.385) (0.513)
F 11.84 13.89 12.12 11.21 30.97 19.52 13.45
2
Static
0.532 -0.0909 0.531∗∗ 0.412∗ 0.283 1.081∗∗∗ 1.076∗∗∗
(0.326) (0.152) (0.237) (0.232) (0.369) (0.295) (0.250)
F 11.27 11.85 13.50 10.72 13.14 15.65 12.58
Dyn.
0.889 -0.138 0.925∗ 0.730∗ 0.611 1.856∗∗∗ 1.663∗∗∗
(0.606) (0.204) (0.495) (0.377) (0.523) (0.575) (0.496)
F 7.116 9.122 7.552 7.704 11.01 9.891 8.094
3
Static
0.303 -0.0756 0.346∗ 0.561∗∗ -0.0650 0.722∗∗ 0.988∗∗∗
(0.235) (0.168) (0.199) (0.224) (0.243) (0.351) (0.302)
F 26.34 22.10 38.18 28.95 51.17 76.25 24.78
Dyn.
0.188 -0.0130 0.0931 0.807∗∗∗ 0.132 0.798 1.058∗∗∗
(0.344) (0.230) (0.395) (0.302) (0.362) (0.496) (0.371)
F 19.54 19.17 27.73 20.02 39.72 64.83 20.51
4
Static
0.541 -0.0326 0.576∗∗ 0.561∗∗ 0.00975 0.930∗∗∗ 1.205∗∗∗
(0.425) (0.213) (0.273) (0.251) (0.329) (0.279) (0.337)
F 19.05 17.50 23.05 18.73 51.88 50.16 19.61
Dyn.
0.748 0.0249 0.665∗ 0.837∗∗ 0.362 1.087∗∗∗ 1.412∗∗∗
(0.599) (0.255) (0.400) (0.389) (0.421) (0.385) (0.461)
F 11.56 14.93 15.97 13.73 39.54 42.81 17.07
5
Static
0.619 0.0197 0.665∗∗ 0.208 0.0245 0.577∗∗ 1.043∗∗∗
(0.443) (0.133) (0.334) (0.268) (0.259) (0.234) (0.255)
F 18.72 14.41 21.00 14.20 29.01 25.49 18.28
Dyn.
0.926 0.0339 0.949∗ 0.550 0.532 0.964∗∗ 1.470∗∗∗
(0.682) (0.150) (0.544) (0.382) (0.385) (0.395) (0.496)
F 12.03 12.50 12.87 11.99 29.62 15.87 14.13
6
Static
0.537 0.0822 0.632∗∗ 0.141 -0.0362 0.651∗∗∗ 0.919∗∗∗
(0.371) (0.171) (0.301) (0.255) (0.277) (0.182) (0.228)
F 20.19 15.82 19.94 15.06 19.02 20.65 18.05
Dyn.
0.925 0.106 1.009∗∗ 0.515 0.375 1.013∗∗∗ 1.426∗∗∗
(0.643) (0.183) (0.513) (0.373) (0.455) (0.355) (0.430)
F 14.77 14.89 13.58 13.71 22.71 17.40 13.56
Continued on next page
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Table 8 – continued from previous page
Row Model C G C+G I X M M-X
7
Static
0.533 0.121 0.626∗∗ 0.101 -0.0299 0.647∗∗∗ 0.959∗∗∗
(0.380) (0.157) (0.294) (0.262) (0.262) (0.206) (0.210)
F 19.29 15.10 20.59 15.25 22.03 20.93 18.45
Dyn.
1.070 0.102 1.068∗∗ 0.0970 0.406 1.348∗∗∗ 1.280∗∗∗
(0.665) (0.171) (0.496) (0.356) (0.492) (0.333) (0.400)
F 12.50 13.38 12.40 14.73 21.29 13.59 14.78
8
Static
1.533∗∗ -0.223 1.389∗∗ 0.201 -0.542 0.571 1.835∗∗∗
(0.717) (0.230) (0.548) (0.403) (0.691) (0.484) (0.547)
F 9.141 9.387 10.43 9.050 10.79 8.912 10.08
Dynamic
1.566∗ -0.349 1.408∗∗ 0.745 -0.0609 1.307∗ 2.485∗∗∗
(0.911) (0.288) (0.673) (0.479) (1.069) (0.792) (0.896)
F 8.690 8.690 9.017 7.855 8.758 8.156 7.961
9
Static
1.583∗∗ -0.0706 1.282∗∗ -0.187 -0.128 0.308 0.981∗∗
(0.795) (0.315) (0.626) (0.478) (0.472) (0.390) (0.457)
F 9.665 12.58 9.033 8.418 11.12 13.20 8.509
Dyn.
1.766∗ -0.193 1.370∗ -0.0103 1.117 1.149∗ 1.347∗∗
(1.027) (0.436) (0.755) (0.649) (0.905) (0.696) (0.660)
F 8.599 10.75 6.999 6.179 9.434 10.44 5.168
Note: The entries in this table show the long-run eﬀect of aid on household consumption (C), govern-
ment consumption (G), total consumption (C + G), gross capital formation (I), exports (X), imports
(M) and net imports (M −X) in models with (“Dyn.”) and without (“Static”) a lagged dependent
variable. All variables expressed relative to GDP. CCE IV estimation on three-year averages (1971-
2012) using an instrument based on initial shares in donor budgets over 1960-70, unless noted below.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered by country, in brackets. Standard errors (SE) for
long-run eﬀects based on the delta method. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote significance at 10, 5 and 1%
respectively. F shows the first-stage F-statistic.
Row 1 repeats the main results from Tables 1-7 for ease of comparison (N = 88, NT = 1099).
Row 2 includes small countries (N = 103, NT = 1248).
Row 3 replaces aid and the instrument by their first lag; sample starts with 1974-76 (N = 88,
NT = 1039).
Row 4 replaces aid and the instrument by averages of their current and one-period-lagged values;
sample starts with 1974-76 (N = 88, NT = 1032).
Row 5 excludes the first period (1971-73) from estimation (N = 88, NT = 1032).
Row 6 uses an instrument based on initial shares over 1960-73; sample starts with 1974-76 (N = 91,
NT = 1061).
Row 7 uses an instrument based on initial shares over 1960-73; sample starts with 1977-79 (N = 91,
NT = 993).
Row 8 uses only donors whose Herfindahl-Hirschman index never exceeds 0.25 in any sample period
(N = 88, NT = 1099).
Row 9 excludes outliers (N = 81, NT = 1004).
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Responses to aid may take time to emerge, as Clemens et al. (2012) argue. In
Table 8, we estimate models with lagged aid rather than current aid (row 3) and using
six-year averages of aid and the instrument (row 4).26 These point to stronger eﬀects of
aid on investment, but we interpret this cautiously. As we discuss later, our findings on
investment are more sensitive to modelling choices than our findings on consumption and
net imports. Section B.5 of the online appendix reports on some additional variations
on these robustness tests.
We now turn to potential criticisms of our instrument. Serial correlation in country-
specific conditions might undermine exogeneity (Card, 2001). Another concern is that
the relevance of the instrument could decline over time. Our IV strategy relies on the
idea that shares in donor budgets in 1960-70 are informative about exposure to later
changes in total donor budgets. If strategic or economic connections between countries
evolve, the instrument may have less explanatory power for aid in later periods. We
address these concerns as follows. Row 5 in Table 8 repeats the main analysis but
excludes the first period. Row 6 uses an instrument based on initial shares calculated
over the period 1960-73 and an estimation sample that starts with 1974-76. Row 7
excludes the first period from this sample. Section B.5 of the online appendix reports
some further variations, including ones with the initial shares calculated over 1960-76.
We might expect instrument strength to weaken when early time periods are ex-
cluded, and this is what we find. The estimated second-stage coeﬃcients are fairly
stable, however, when dropping early time periods. In rows 5-7, we continue to find
that aid is absorbed via higher consumption and higher imports, without much eﬀect
on exports. In experiments that drop up to three periods, the point estimates are quite
stable, but the results for total consumption become a little less precise once we drop
three periods; see Section B.5 of the online appendix. We also note that, if serially-
correlated shocks were a major problem in our static models, we would have expected
a greater contrast between static and dynamic models in Tables 1-7.
It could be argued that our instrument makes use of too many donors. By considering
all DAC donors, we have included some whose budgets could be dominated by a few
recipients, which risks endogeneity. To investigate this, row 8 in Table 8 shows results
using an instrument based only on less specialized donors, whose HH index never exceeds
0.25.27 The instrument remains informative and the results are in line with our main
findings, but yield larger point estimates for the eﬀects of aid on consumption and on
26In rows 3 and 4, the first period of the sample is dropped and the sample starts in the period
1974-76. This avoids overlap between the period over which the initial shares in donor budgets are
calculated (1960-70) and the periods over which aid receipts are measured.
27This leaves eighteen donors. In descending order by their share of world aid, averaged over 1960-
2012, these are the USA, Japan, France, Germany, IDA, EU institutions, UK, Netherlands, Canada,
Italy, WFP, Sweden, UNDP, Norway, Denmark, UNICEF, Switzerland, and UNTA.
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net imports. We cannot reject full absorption achieved through higher consumption.28
Next, we consider whether donors have been sorting themselves across recipient
countries in a way that could undermine identification. We examine this using an
approach developed by Greenstone et al. (2015). We implement two versions of their
test and, in both cases, find little evidence that sorting has taken place. But there are
some grounds for caution over the applicability of these tests in our setting, and Section
B.3 of the online appendix examines these issues in greater detail.
We also investigate the possibility of outliers. Given that we use 2SLS, outliers could
arise in the first stage or the second stage. Some of our robustness checks give rise to
large first-stage F statistics, which may be a warning sign of outliers. To address this,
we use the robust instrumental variable estimator of Cohen Freue et al. (2013), after
partialling out fixed eﬀects and cross-section means. As they discuss, robust parameter
estimates can then be used to identify multivariate outliers. Across our dependent
variables, seven countries regularly give rise to one or more outlying country-period
observations: Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic
of Congo, Jordan, Madagascar, and Mauritania. The results when we exclude them
are shown in Row 9 of Table 8. In line with our main findings, the instrument retains
explanatory power, and we cannot reject strong eﬀects of aid on net imports, household
consumption and total consumption. The eﬀects on net imports are suﬃciently strong
that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of full absorption. In the dynamic model, the
increase in net imports appears to arise from higher imports rather than lower exports.
The estimated eﬀect of aid on investment is too imprecise to draw conclusions, and this
remains the case in models (not reported) that allow for delayed eﬀects.
We now consider an alternative estimation method. Thus far, we have emphasized
estimators that use a within transformation. For the static models, another way to
eliminate country-specific eﬀects is to first diﬀerence the model.29 A comparison of the
two approaches should be informative about the validity of our assumptions, and help
to address potential concerns. In particular, our dependent and independent variables
both contain nominal GDP in the denominator, as does the instrument. This would be
problematic if some function of nominal GDP cannot legitimately be excluded from the
models we estimate: in that case, the instrument would be correlated with the error
term. But, given the persistence of GDP, first diﬀerencing would weaken the correlation
between the instrument and the error term in diﬀerences. Hence, we investigate the
28With a lower cutoﬀ, 0.15 or 0.20, we get similar results to the 0.25 cutoﬀ used in the table. With
a higher cutoﬀ of 0.30 we get similar results again, while a cutoﬀ of 0.35 leads to long-run eﬀects on
consumption and net imports closer to our main findings.
29Under our maintained assumptions, an estimator based on first diﬀerences should have the same
probability limit as a within groups estimator, but is likely to be more eﬃcient if the error term is highly
persistent; see Wooldridge (2010, pp. 321-326). The result is likely to apply even for CCE estimators.
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results from this approach, and compare them to our earlier findings.
If we first diﬀerence the model implied by equations (1)-(2), we obtain:
∆(Qit/Yit) = β∆(Ait/Yit) + λ
′
i
∆Ft +∆εit (3)
and if we define a new set of factors F 2
t
≡ ∆Ft, we can estimate the model in first
diﬀerences using the CCE IV estimator as before. Results based on first diﬀerences are
shown in rows 1 and 2 of Table 9. The first three-year period in these regressions is
1974-76, to avoid overlap with the years used to construct the instrument. In the case
of row 1, the eﬀect of aid on total consumption is still present, but the eﬀect on net
imports is less precisely estimated than before, and the eﬀect on imports is smaller.
In row 2, we have dropped the same seven outliers identified previously. This greatly
strengthens the results: now aid has significant eﬀects on total consumption, household
consumption, imports and net imports. The eﬀect of aid on net imports is somewhat
lower in magnitude than in our baseline results. These estimates suggest that absorption
may be less than complete but, given the high standard error, it remains true that we
cannot reject the null of full absorption.
Table 9: First-diﬀerenced models
Row Sample C G C+G I X M M-X
1
Full
0.618 0.0597 0.653∗ -0.217 -0.0685 0.385∗ 0.689
(0.418) (0.107) (0.347) (0.272) (0.329) (0.195) (0.431)
F 21.12 22.01 22.83 17.31 18.45 16.44 23.95
2
No 1.273∗∗ 0.157 1.308∗∗∗ -0.856∗ 0.250 0.750∗ 0.607∗∗
outliers (0.498) (0.164) (0.460) (0.497) (0.407) (0.407) (0.252)
F 9.049 10.42 9.760 8.054 9.381 7.888 9.080
Note: The entries show the eﬀects of aid on household consumption (C), government consumption
(G), total consumption (C + G), gross capital formation (I), exports (X), imports (M) and net
imports (M − X) in static first-diﬀerenced models. All variables measured relative to GDP. CCE IV
estimation on three-year averages (1974-2012) using an instrument based on initial shares in donor
budgets over 1960-70. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered by country, in brackets. ∗,
∗∗, and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. F shows the first-stage F-statistic.
Row 1 is a first-diﬀerences version of row 1 in Table 8 (N = 88, NT = 1032).
Row 2 removes outliers and is a first-diﬀerences version of row 9 in Table 8 (N = 81, NT = 943).
The first-diﬀerenced results suggest that our earlier findings are not spurious. Nev-
ertheless, a sceptical observer might still be worried about a ‘false positive’, because the
variables in our regressions take the form of ratios to nominal GDP. In principle, this
could lead to an observed relationship between two ratios even when their numerators
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are unrelated.30 One reason to doubt this interpretation is the pattern of the results.
We consistently find that the ratios of consumption and net imports to GDP are in-
creasing in aid intensity, in line with theoretical predictions, while the eﬀects of aid on
the other ratios are weaker, again in line with theory. A convincing story based on ‘false
positives’ would have to explain why spurious correlations emerge for some ratios and
not others, and why the magnitudes of the estimated eﬀects remain plausible. But to
investigate this further, Section B.5 of the online appendix reports on some additional
analysis, including models with the dependent variable in logarithms and the logarithm
of nominal GDP included as an explanatory variable. The results on absorption and its
channels are in line with our main findings.
In summary, we have carried out a range of robustness tests. These include demand-
ing versions of CCE and CCE IV estimators with many additional parameters, and go
beyond those typically used in the literature. It is not surprising that the eﬀects some-
times become imprecise, but the point estimates are quite stable, and rarely change
sign. Across a range of models and approaches, we continue to find that aid is absorbed
in line with theoretical predictions, and with eﬀect sizes that have plausible magnitudes.
More precise estimates are likely to require longer spans of data or the use of additional
instruments, such as those of Galiani et al. (2017) or Jarotschkin and Kraay (2016). In
the meantime, we note that our findings are consistent with Werker et al. (2009), while
adopting a new approach to identification and filtering out common factors. Moreover,
in contrast to previous studies based on distinct natural experiments, the results we
present relate to a broad concept of aid, for the full set of DAC donors.
7 Conclusions
Using cross-country data to study aid is fraught with diﬃculties, and yet some research
questions are hard to answer any other way. This paper has aimed to make progress
on two fronts. First, we have introduced a new instrument that can be used to identify
persistent changes in aid, and combined it with a panel time series estimator that
filters out unobserved common factors, even when their eﬀects diﬀer across countries.
This approach is an advance on much of the existing literature. Second, we use the
instrument to investigate the eﬀects of aid on domestic absorption, consumption and
investment, and whether aid is associated with Dutch Disease.
The evidence suggests that aid is absorbed at least partially, and we cannot reject the
hypothesis of full absorption, in which aid increases net imports one-for-one. Absorption
seems to arise mainly via increased imports, and we find no evidence that aid lowers
30See Kronmal (1993). In the aid literature, the problem was noted by Arndt et al. (2010).
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exports through Dutch Disease eﬀects. We also investigate the relationship between aid
and the separate components of domestic expenditure. Our estimates suggest that aid
is absorbed primarily by increased consumption rather than investment. Although we
do sometimes find a significant eﬀect of aid on investment, it seems less robust than
the eﬀect on consumption.
Overall, the supply-push instrument appears to work well. For many of the dependent
variables studied, instrumenting for aid has a substantial eﬀect on the results. The
instrument is strong enough to generate some informative findings, and as future years
of data become available, the prospects for robust and precise estimates should improve
further. The instrument could have many possible applications in the future study of
aid.
Appendix A The CCE IV estimator
Here, we outline how the Common Correlated Eﬀects (CCE) approach of Pesaran (2006)
can be applied in a 2SLS setting, based on Harding and Lamarche (2011). Using their
notation, we consider a model for i = 1, ..., N and t = 1, ..., T :
yit = βxit + εit
εit = λ
′
i
Ft + uit
xit = piwit + Λ
′
i
Ft + vit
The second equation represents the multifactor error structure, where λi is an r×1 vector
of factor loadings, and Ft are the r common factors, where λi and Ft are unobserved.
We assume a single endogenous variable xit and a single instrument wit which satisfies
the usual requirements for identification. For simplicity, we do not cover deterministic
time components (such as time trends) or factor loadings that are correlated with the
regressors; for a more general treatment, see Harding and Lamarche (2011).
We gather y and x in the vector zit = (yit, xit)
′. The above expressions can be
combined to obtain:
zit = C1wit + C
′
3i
Ft + ξit
where ξit = (βvit + uit, vit)
′ and C1 = (piβ, pi)
′, C3i = ((Λiβ + λi)
′,Λ′
i
)′, where our
notation again follows Harding and Lamarche (2011).
The next step is to take cross-section means, to obtain:
zt = C1wt + C
′
3
Ft + ξt
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where bars over variables indicate cross-section means. Pre-multiplying by C3 and
rearranging for Ft, we have:
Ft = (C3C
′
3
)−1C3(zt − C1wt − ξt)
We first consider the case of OLS estimation of the equation for yit when xit is
strictly exogenous and there is no instrument wit. If we substitute the above expression
for Ft into the model yit = βxit + λ
′
i
Ft + uit, this suggests that we can proxy for
the unobserved Ft by including cross-section means of yit and xit. These cross-section
means will require country-specific coeﬃcients, to allow the factor loadings λi to diﬀer
across countries. This approach is due to Pesaran (2006), and the estimator we have
just described corresponds to his pooled CCE (CCEP) estimator. He showed that, under
regularity conditions, ξt → 0 and C3 → C3 (constant) as the cross-section dimension
tends to infinity. The CCEP estimator of β is then asymptotically (large N) unbiased
and normally distributed as (N, T ) jointly tend to infinity.
One limitation is that, for the estimator of β to be asymptotically unbiased, the
number r of unobserved factors Ft can be no greater than the number of observable
variables — typically three or four in the estimates of this paper. Intuitively, this is
because the unobserved factors Ft are only eliminated completely if they lie in the space
spanned by the cross-section means; see Sarafidis and Wansbeek (2012, p. 496). Stating
this more formally, the properties of CCEP summarized above rely on a rank condition
on C3. But the CCEP estimator may improve on more conventional estimators, and
lead to bias reduction, even when the rank condition is not met; see Pesaran (2006) for
discussion and simulations.
Harding and Lamarche (2011) extend the CCE approach to 2SLS panel estimation,
when xit is endogenous and a suitable instrument wit is available. Again using the above
expression for Ft, the 2SLS analogue to the CCEP estimator introduces cross-section
means into the first and second stage of 2SLS, with country-specific coeﬃcients in
each case. In simulations, Harding and Lamarche show that this estimator outperforms
conventional estimators in cases with unobserved factors and endogeneity (Design III in
their Table 1). It is easy to implement: we augment an otherwise conventional FE IV
model with the cross-section means of the observable variables (y, x, w) in the first and
second stage, interacted with country dummies in each case.
As noted in the main text, the interactive fixed eﬀects specification nests conven-
tional fixed eﬀects (corresponding to a constant factor Ft = 1) and time dummies
(corresponding to λi = λ for one of the factors Ft).
31 As Harding and Lamarche (2014,
31A technical aside is that, when augmenting models with cross-section means in a CCE approach,
time dummies should be excluded; see Sarafidis and Wansbeek (2012, p. 502).
30
fn. 3) note, a CCE approach can be combined with fixed eﬀects — in our case, country
dummies — which in our notation corresponds to introducing a factor Ft = 1. In simu-
lations for their quantile regression setting, an estimator which uses conventional fixed
eﬀects as well as cross-section means has the best small-sample performance. In this
paper, we also include fixed eﬀects, and use CCE IV to denote this modified version of
the Harding and Lamarche (2011) estimator. But our main findings are not sensitive to
this choice, as discussed in Section B.5 of the online appendix.
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Appendix B Online appendix
B.1 Aid and absorption in theory
We briefly consider the aggregate eﬀects of aid in two-sector models. When aid increases
demand for traded and non-traded goods, it might be anticipated that the price of non-
traded goods would increase. But in standard versions of the dependent economy model
with traded and non-traded goods, the relative price of non-traded goods is invariant
to aid in the long run. In models with two sectors and two factors, with sectoral factor
mobility and international capital mobility, the long-run relative price depends solely on
supply conditions. For more on dynamic dependent economy models, see chapter 4 of
Turnovsky (1997).
Brock and Turnovsky (1994) and Brock (1996) showed that long-run adjustment
depends on the relative capital intensities of the traded and non-traded sectors. In the
long-run equilibrium, imports of traded goods can be financed partly by aid as well as
exports, and hence aid is associated with a smaller traded sector in the long run. Since
the long-run relative price is invariant to the transfer, aid can increase or decrease the
steady-state capital stock, depending on the relative capital intensities of non-traded
and traded production. This implies that aid could be associated with higher or lower
gross investment in the long run.
B.2 Further notes on the instrument
In this appendix, we first sketch an argument that a supply-push instrument should be
based on initial shares rather than average shares. First note that, if the initial share
were instead the current share, the synthetic instrument would be equal to the variable
it is instrumenting (current aid receipts) and hence endogenous. But the current share is
one component of the average share: in the simple case of one donor with a total budget
Dt at date t, taking the average of the shares over time means that the instrument for
recipient i at date t is (1/T ) · (ai1 + ...+ aiT ) ·Dt/Yit, in which one component of the
sum is therefore aitDt/Yit, or current aid at date t. Hence, using average shares implies
the value of the instrument at each date is a function of the endogenous variable at that
date: this will typically imply some degree of endogeneity, although it may achieve bias
reduction. In addition, at least some of the aid shares in other periods are likely to be
a function of the transient errors at earlier dates, and this could reinforce the probable
failure of exogeneity when using average shares.
The use of budget shares, whether initial or average, might raise another concern.
The supply-push instrument itself has a factor structure: it is a weighted average of donor
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budgets, with sets of weights (initial budget shares) that vary across aid recipients. It
might be thought that this will lead the instrument to be eliminated from the first stage
of 2SLS estimation when filtering out the common factors. It is easy to show, however,
that with one endogenous variable and one instrument, the instrument is only eliminated
from the first stage in two unlikely cases: either when there is a single donor, or when
the initial shares of aid recipients in donor budgets are the same across donors.32 Since
in practice there are multiple donors and budget shares diﬀer across donors, in principle
our instrument will retain explanatory power in the first stage, even conditional on the
inclusion of cross-section means with country-specific coeﬃcients. Moreover, this is a
testable assumption.
But a remaining concern with our initial-share instrument is that conditions specific
to individual aid recipients, such as their domestic political developments, may be serially
correlated. For each country, the initial share in a donor’s budget may then be correlated
with shocks in some of the subsequent periods, which undermines the exogeneity of the
instrument. This potential limitation of the supply-push approach is acknowledged by
Card (2001, footnote 23). It is likely to be an especial concern for the earlier time periods
of the panel, and when there are relatively few time periods overall. We investigate the
problem by dropping some of the early time periods from the estimated models. This
means that the initial share is measured some years before the first time period used
for estimation. When we do this, we find no warning signs that our main results are
substantially aﬀected by underlying serial correlation in country-specific conditions. The
results are reported in Table 8 in the main text and, especially, in Table B.1 below.
B.3 Sorting and identification
This subsection explains the assumptions we use for identification in more detail, and
summarizes the results of a test of sorting, based on the Greenstone et al. (2015) working
paper. The test makes assumptions that may not be reasonable in our setting but, when
implemented, does not provide any evidence against our approach to identification.
We begin by recalling that our instrument for recipient country i at time t can be
written as: ∑
d
ad
i0
(Ddt/Yit)
where d indexes donors, ad
i0
is the initial share of recipient i in donor d’s budget, Ddt
is the donor’s nominal budget and Yit is the nominal GDP of the recipient. From the
construction of the instrument, it is clear that the instrument will not be influenced by
32Under the stated conditions, the instrument would be perfectly collinear within each country with
the cross-section mean of the instrument, and then identification fails.
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donors reallocating aid within their total budget in response to time-varying recipient
conditions. Indeed, this is one way to understand what the instrument achieves.
But a remaining threat to identification is that total donor budgets may be functions
of the time-varying conditions of individual aid recipients. Informally, this may not be
a persuasive account of how total donor aid budgets are determined. In most cases,
they seem likely to evolve through a longer-term political process, such as the UK’s
commitment to give 0.7% of GDP. Moreover, if total donor budgets respond strongly to
the conditions of multiple recipients, this would tend to suggest that total aid budgets
will be highly volatile — and it is not clear this is true in the data. Nevertheless, we can
study when this source of endogeneity might be a major problem for our instrument.
Our analysis runs parallel with the study of bank lending by Greenstone et al. (2015).
One diﬀerence is that our results use multiple periods of a panel, whereas Greenstone
et al. work with first-diﬀerenced cross-section regressions, which are then estimated
separately for diﬀerent time periods. Nevertheless, we can draw on their work to clarify
the assumptions we rely on in our own setting.
We denote time-varying recipient-specific conditions by cit. A natural example in
our case would be the political conditions within aid recipient i at time t. We can think
of the recipient-specific conditions as the counterpart to the county-level demand shock
in Greenstone et al. In the following discussion, we assume that cit cannot be observed
by the econometrician but influences aid flows and also the dependent variable. It will
then be a component of the transitory error term in the models that we estimate, and
the source of the overall endogeneity problem we are seeking to address.
We now write the total donor budget for donor d as a function of recipient conditions,
and a supply-side variable Sdt which captures exogenous changes in the size of a donor’s
total aid budget. Since aid budgets typically increase exponentially over time, whether
in nominal or real terms, we use the following formulation:
Ddt = exp
⎛
⎝piidcit +∑
k =i
pikdckt + Sdt
⎞
⎠
where the new piid parameters capture the responsiveness of the total aid budget for
donor d to country i conditions. Note that the piid will not be the same as the overall
responsiveness of the donor’s aid to recipient i, because thus far, we are modelling only
the response of the total donor budget, and not reallocations within the budget.
We can now substitute this expression into that for the instrument for country i at
time t: ∑
d
ad
i0
exp (piidcit) exp
⎛
⎝∑
k =i
pikdckt
⎞
⎠ exp (Sdt) (1/Yit)
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This expression highlights three forces that influence the extent of a correlation
between the instrument for a given recipient, and that recipient’s conditions. These are
the three terms in exponentials, written separately for clarity.
The first term is the direct eﬀect of recipient conditions, working through the total
budget — it is this direct eﬀect which risks an endogeneity problem. The second term
reflects the dependence of the total budget on the conditions of other countries, which
will typically weaken the association between the instrument for this recipient and the
recipient’s own conditions. This is especially likely when donors spread their aid relatively
evenly over many recipients. The last exponential term, in Sdt, reflects the supply-side
measure of the donor’s generosity, determined independently of recipient conditions.
Note also that these exponentials are summed across donors. Hence, if the piid
parameters vary across donors, the summation across donors should also weaken the
association between recipient conditions and the final instrument. Problems could arise
if the piid parameters are simultaneously high for several large donors (those with large
values of Sdt). Large donors matter more, because they receive more weight in the sum
over donors, through the Sdt term.
But even then, note the role of the second exponential. The sensitivity of donor
budgets to the conditions of other recipients, in the context of many recipients, should
ensure that the final instrument for aid to country i does not vary strongly with the
conditions of country i in most cases. There may be a few exceptions — for example,
when donors give a large share of their budget to a recipient, and that recipient receives
most of their aid from that donor — but in general it seems likely that the instrument
will be uncorrelated with recipient conditions for most recipients.
More formally, our approach assumes that donors spread their aid relatively evenly
over many recipient countries, which is likely to weaken the association between donor
budgets and the conditions of a given recipient. In terms of our expression above, if
aid is spread across many recipients relatively evenly, this will reduce the contribution
of the first exponential relative to the second. This indicates why it is relevant to
consider within-donor fragmentation, using Herfindahl-Hirschman indices. If donors give
to multiple countries, in a way that does not concentrate their aid on a small number
of countries, it becomes less plausible to imagine that total aid budgets are responding
strongly to the conditions of a given recipient.
There could still be a concern that the piid parameters, capturing the responsiveness
of total aid budgets, could be simultaneously high for larger donors, risking a correlation
between the instrument and recipient conditions for at least a subset of recipients. But,
as noted before, strong budgetary responses of that type, across many recipients, would
be likely to generate greater overall volatility of total aid budgets than is observed
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empirically, given that donor budgets are often fairly stable as shares of donor GDP.
Our supply-push instrument has parallels in the analysis of bank lending by Green-
stone et al. (2015). In developing their own supply-push instrument, they allow lending
outcomes at the bank-county level to depend on a county eﬀect (demand) and a bank
eﬀect (supply), assuming that demand shocks do not have bank-specific eﬀects; this is
equation (5) in their paper. They use this partly to study whether individual banks may
be sorting into activity at particular locations, which could threaten identification.
We implement this test below, but note that an assumption used in Greenstone et al.
(2015) is unlikely to be reasonable in our setting. To examine this further, we describe
a model for aid flows at the recipient-donor-time (i, d, t) level. A natural model in the
aid case, with links to the aid allocation literature, is:
aididt =
[
exp (θidcit)∑
k exp (θkdckt)
]
Ddt exp(uidt)
=
[
exp (θidcit)∑
k exp (θkdckt)
]
exp
⎛
⎝piidcit +∑
k =i
pikdckt + Sdt
⎞
⎠ exp(uidt)
where the new θid parameters reflect aid allocation, and index the responsiveness of a
donor to recipient conditions through reallocations within the donor’s overall budget.
For simplicity, we interpret uidt as measurement error.
As this expression makes clear, without further assumptions, there is no clean way in
which to use donor-time fixed eﬀects to extract estimates of the supply-push parameters
Sdt needed for the Greenstone et al. (2015) test. This is because several of the other
terms in this expression will also contribute to variation in the dimensions (d, t) and so
the various eﬀects are likely to be confounded in a regression making use of donor-time
fixed eﬀects. Unless we observe the θid and piid parameters directly, or assume they
are the same across donors to eliminate their dependence on the index d, we cannot
separate the supply-push shocks Sdt cleanly from the responses of donors to recipient
conditions.
This point runs parallel to Greenstone et al. (2015), who explicitly assume that
diﬀerent banks respond in exactly the same way to a given demand shock, as they note
on page 12 of the September 2015 version. The restriction could be plausible in their
case, but the corresponding assumption seems implausible in our setting. This is partly
because of the role of connections between specific donor-recipient pairs, and partly
because the large empirical literature on aid allocation has documented that donors
diﬀer in their responses to observable variables.
To make the issues clearer, drop the t subscript from the previous equation, and
rewrite it in log-diﬀerences to get:
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∆ log aidid = (θid + piid)∆ci +
∑
k =i
pikd∆ck −∆ log
(∑
k
exp [θkdck]
)
+∆Sd +∆uid
If we assume θid = θi and piid = pii, then the above can be written as the sum of a
recipient eﬀect and a donor eﬀect:
∆ log aidid = c
′
i
+ S ′
d
+∆uid
which is a decomposition parallel to Greenstone et al. (2015). We now describe what
happens when we implement this decomposition, estimate the donor fixed eﬀects Sd,
and run sorting tests similar to those of Greenstone et al. (2015). In brief, we find no
evidence of sorting.
In more detail, to run the sorting test, we estimate an equation for the first-diﬀerence
of log aid at the recipient-donor level for each time period, with recipient and donor
fixed eﬀects. We extract the estimated donor eﬀects. Across recipients, we then run a
regression of the fixed eﬀect of a recipient’s most important donor on the fixed eﬀect
of the recipient’s second most important donor. An alternative version of the test, also
taken from Greenstone et al. (2015), uses a share-weighted average of the fixed eﬀects
of donors other than the largest donor.
If there is sorting of donors across recipients, these regressions should reveal a sig-
nificant positive correlation for at least some time periods. In practice, for the fourteen
time periods we study, the correlation is positive and significant at the 10% level in only
one case out of fourteen, a result that could easily arise by chance. We obtain a similar
result using the alternative version of the test, based on the share-weighted average:
again, there is one correlation which is positive and (close to) significant at the 10%
level, but the rest are not. In summary, we find little evidence of sorting that could
threaten identification.
Overall, we consider that the eﬀect of recipient conditions on total donor budgets
will not be a major threat to identification given: (1) the relatively plausible scenario
that total aid budgets are determined by a medium-run political process which does not
respond strongly to the conditions of many individual recipients (see, for example, the
UK’s formal commitment to give 0.7% of GDP); and (2) we also present evidence, based
on Herfindahl-Hirschman indices, that aid budgets are dispersed widely (within-donor
fragmentation). Moreover, many recipients receive aid from many sources (within-
recipient fragmentation). This suggests that the instrument and recipient conditions
will not be strongly correlated for most aid recipients, once the various summations
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have been worked through in the construction of the instrument for each recipient.
Finally, we note that the arguments above have made no particular assumptions
about the process driving recipient conditions. The aid literature has sometimes used
instruments based on interacting a single driving variable with a country characteristic,
an approach that might be sensitive to assumptions about recipient conditions: for
example, those conditions might be driven by country-level trends that are correlated
with the driving variable. Two aspects of our approach help us to avoid that problem.
First, since we are averaging across the total budgets of many donors, we use the
fragmentation of global aid flows to lessen the risk that the instrument is correlated
with the conditions of individual aid recipients. Second, we use the CCE approach to
address a remaining concern, that total donor budgets could be influenced by common
factors (such as world economic conditions) that are correlated with conditions in aid
recipients. Our combination of a supply-push instrument and CCE IV estimation is
new, and should ensure identification in a wider range of circumstances than has been
possible to date.
B.4 Testing equality of estimates
One question of interest is whether the findings from CCE IV diﬀer from more con-
ventional approaches, such as FE IV. The discussion in the main text emphasizes the
economic magnitude of the diﬀerences in point estimates. In this section, we describe a
test of whether the diﬀerences in parameter estimates across estimators are statistically
significant, using the distribution of their diﬀerence. Our model for the macroeconomic
outcome of interest Qit/Yit is given by:
Qit/Yit = β (Ait/Yit) + εit (B.1)
εit = λ
′
i
Ft + uit (B.2)
We want to test whether allowing for common factors has a material eﬀect on the
parameter estimate β, the eﬀect of aid. This is a non-standard testing problem, but we
can test whether β changes to a significant extent using our bootstrap estimates. We
call one estimate βˆ1 (say, FE IV) and the other βˆ2 (say, CCE IV). Since our bootstrap
yields a simulated joint distribution for βˆ1 and βˆ2, we can construct a test statistic:
(βˆ1 − βˆ2)
2
V ar(βˆ1) + V ar(βˆ2)− 2Cov(βˆ1, βˆ2)
where the variances and the covariance are taken from our bootstrapped estimates. For
example, to compare FE IV with CCE IV, we estimate the coeﬃcient under FE IV and
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the coeﬃcient under CCE IV for each of the bootstrap samples. We can then calculate
the test statistic above. If the parameter estimates are asymptotically normal under the
null, the test statistic will have a χ2 distribution with one degree of freedom.
Compared to a standard Hausman test, this approach does not require one estimator
to be asymptotically eﬃcient. This is because we have simulated the joint distribution
of the parameter estimates rather than (as in the Hausman test) using a theoretical
result about their covariance. The formal interpretation of the test is heuristic, in that
we proceed as if both βˆ1 and βˆ2 correspond to well-defined parameters in a population,
which is open to question in this setting. Given this qualification, the results should be
seen as only indicative. Since the testing problem is non-standard, there is no better
approach readily available.
B.5 Additional robustness checks
In this section we discuss a wide range of additional robustness checks. These are
reported in Table B.1 and, similarly to Table 8, the first row presents our main results
for ease of comparison. In row 2, we report results which omit conventional fixed eﬀects.
In this case, time-invariant country eﬀects will be captured by a linear combination of the
cross-section means, given that they have country-specific coeﬃcients. This approach,
since it reduces the number of parameters, provides a useful check that our findings
are not driven by over-fitting. As can be seen by comparing rows 1 and 2, our findings
are not sensitive to this change. This exercise is informative partly because it helps to
confirm that our main results do not somehow reflect an extreme over-fitting problem
that has not been communicated by the standard errors. If that was the case, the results
should have changed markedly in moving from row 1 to row 2. In fact, the two sets of
results are very close to each other.
The other robustness tests we present generally move in the other direction — to
greater robustness, at the expense of reduced eﬃciency. We first examine the implica-
tions of transitions from colonial rule to independence. In some cases, the DAC dataset
includes reports of aid flows before an aid recipient became independent. This implies
that, for some countries, we have constructed an instrument based on initial shares in
donor budgets in the period 1960-70 even though the country only became independ-
ent later. To the extent that recorded aid flows before independence are incomplete
or measured less accurately, this may aﬀect our results. Hence, as an alternative, we
calculate the aid variable (and the initial shares in donor budgets needed to construct an
instrument) after discarding aid data in the years before a recipient’s independence.33
33The year of independence is taken to be the first year that a country is listed in the Polity IV
dataset (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2013). For countries not included in Polity IV, we use the CIA
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The results, shown in row 3 of Table B.1, are again similar to those found before.
Table B.1: Additional robustness checks
Row Model C G C+G I X M M-X
1
Static
0.708 -0.0583 0.662∗∗ 0.279 -0.0464 0.622∗∗∗ 1.085∗∗∗
(0.435) (0.150) (0.284) (0.252) (0.267) (0.210) (0.285)
F 18.18 14.99 19.84 14.67 30.69 29.27 18.14
Dyn.
0.856 -0.0566 0.775∗ 0.700∗ 0.346 1.115∗∗∗ 1.543∗∗∗
(0.655) (0.172) (0.436) (0.394) (0.402) (0.385) (0.513)
F 11.84 13.89 12.12 11.21 30.97 19.52 13.45
2
Static
0.808∗ -0.0552 0.718∗∗ 0.313 -0.299 0.608∗∗ 1.016∗∗∗
(0.473) (0.202) (0.298) (0.246) (0.339) (0.300) (0.247)
F 19.80 18.36 19.32 17.45 21.86 20.18 16.15
Dyn.
0.800 -0.0216 0.724∗ 0.678∗ 0.494 1.396∗∗∗ 1.582∗∗∗
(0.679) (0.247) (0.425) (0.355) (0.509) (0.503) (0.566)
F 16.25 18.35 15.06 13.87 18.21 18.09 12.70
3
Static
0.795∗ -0.149 0.744∗∗ 0.187 -0.155 0.554∗∗ 1.099∗∗∗
(0.470) (0.191) (0.317) (0.267) (0.299) (0.253) (0.291)
F 18.00 16.03 20.02 15.49 30.89 27.57 19.34
Dyn.
1.052 -0.194 0.885∗ 0.612∗ 0.161 1.043∗∗∗ 1.588∗∗∗
(0.690) (0.232) (0.469) (0.351) (0.465) (0.387) (0.518)
F 12.33 14.37 12.39 12.05 27.18 19.40 14.66
4
Static
0.719 -0.0654 0.784∗∗ 0.558∗∗ -0.134 0.990∗∗∗ 1.334∗∗∗
(0.576) (0.206) (0.392) (0.247) (0.432) (0.370) (0.499)
F 7.602 5.275 6.749 5.463 6.495 5.317 5.559
Dyn.
1.303 0.0131 1.417∗∗ 0.845∗ 0.392 1.566∗∗ 1.591∗∗∗
(0.820) (0.328) (0.651) (0.458) (0.653) (0.720) (0.610)
F 8.061 5.944 7.580 3.845 3.296 2.516 5.224
5
Static
0.476 -0.0607 0.557∗∗ 0.424∗∗ -0.0305 0.828∗∗∗ 0.984∗∗∗
(0.320) (0.201) (0.239) (0.186) (0.338) (0.212) (0.217)
F 19.85 13.41 21.40 16.78 27.42 33.04 20.93
Dyn.
0.617 -0.108 0.635∗∗ 0.488∗∗ 0.302 0.856∗∗∗ 1.065∗∗∗
(0.445) (0.233) (0.301) (0.228) (0.415) (0.287) (0.245)
F 10.21 10.87 12.58 13.40 27.31 25.62 15.26
6
Static
0.613 0.0626 0.618∗∗ 0.166 0.0614 0.621∗∗ 1.013∗∗∗
(0.464) (0.111) (0.308) (0.270) (0.246) (0.244) (0.233)
F 18.28 14.34 23.80 15.08 35.05 25.79 20.80
Dyn.
1.027 0.0584 0.949∗ 0.0941 0.546 1.120∗∗∗ 1.331∗∗∗
(0.718) (0.122) (0.509) (0.391) (0.420) (0.396) (0.461)
F 11.23 11.86 13.24 16.15 27.40 13.28 17.81
Continued on next page
World Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/).
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Table B.1 – continued from previous page
Row Model C G C+G I X M M-X
7
Static
0.602 0.120 0.557 0.217 0.158 0.625∗∗ 1.084∗∗∗
(0.528) (0.0854) (0.372) (0.276) (0.236) (0.302) (0.323)
F 15.34 10.90 15.81 10.81 20.15 14.09 13.07
Dyn.
0.943 0.135 0.765 0.215 0.656 1.179∗∗ 1.323∗∗
(0.846) (0.0905) (0.597) (0.398) (0.415) (0.486) (0.548)
F 8.524 8.619 9.171 10.15 14.98 9.339 12.28
8
Static
0.534 0.155 0.594 0.154 0.110 0.670∗∗∗ 1.083∗∗∗
(0.473) (0.132) (0.399) (0.264) (0.283) (0.250) (0.319)
F 14.30 9.650 12.77 11.57 14.79 13.57 12.58
Dyn.
1.154 0.103 0.920 0.257 0.653 1.454∗∗∗ 1.330∗∗
(0.902) (0.110) (0.657) (0.350) (0.545) (0.446) (0.540)
F 7.046 8.070 7.177 9.970 12.49 9.778 10.64
9
Static
1.015 0.0775 0.904 -0.182 -0.0195 0.398 1.235∗∗
(0.729) (0.106) (0.624) (0.340) (0.330) (0.370) (0.499)
F 9.582 6.157 7.454 5.216 9.684 6.543 7.461
Dyn.
1.073 0.0957 1.000 -0.264 0.237 0.724 1.335∗
(0.919) (0.0917) (0.835) (0.603) (0.686) (0.582) (0.756)
F 6.350 5.934 5.566 3.444 5.367 3.692 6.222
10
Static
0.330 0.166 0.552∗∗ 0.133 -0.0150 0.690∗∗∗ 0.857∗∗∗
(0.265) (0.143) (0.255) (0.250) (0.240) (0.204) (0.199)
F 21.91 15.85 21.12 14.48 19.29 20.43 16.76
Dyn.
0.784∗ 0.166 0.935∗∗ 0.138 0.351 1.304∗∗∗ 1.241∗∗∗
(0.442) (0.173) (0.398) (0.330) (0.483) (0.316) (0.415)
F 15.12 14.25 13.81 13.26 16.78 12.87 13.37
11
Static
0.291 0.201∗ 0.482 0.171 0.125 0.723∗∗∗ 0.875∗∗∗
(0.322) (0.120) (0.335) (0.270) (0.247) (0.233) (0.286)
F 16.33 11.03 13.70 11.07 15.04 14.79 12.02
Dyn.
0.746 0.154 0.695 0.318 0.595 1.420∗∗∗ 1.220∗∗
(0.578) (0.128) (0.492) (0.353) (0.536) (0.432) (0.558)
F 8.965 9.430 8.251 9.307 10.98 9.911 9.787
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Static
0.755 0.102 0.765 -0.210 -0.0218 0.455 0.968∗∗
(0.502) (0.0809) (0.503) (0.422) (0.317) (0.378) (0.438)
F 10.79 6.742 8.237 5.529 9.698 7.153 7.973
Dyn.
0.714 0.134 0.855 -0.119 0.154 0.717 1.255∗
(0.548) (0.110) (0.637) (0.560) (0.700) (0.612) (0.759)
F 7.236 5.963 5.857 3.869 5.229 4.365 6.690
Note: The entries in this table show the long-run eﬀect of aid on household consumption (C), govern-
ment consumption (G), total consumption (C + G), gross capital formation (I), exports (X), imports
(M) and net imports (M −X) in models with (“Dyn.”) and without (“Static”) a lagged dependent
variable. All variables expressed relative to GDP. CCE IV estimation on three-year averages (1971-
10
2012) using an instrument based on initial shares in donor budgets over 1960-70, unless noted below.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered by country, in brackets. Standard errors (SE) for
long-run eﬀects based on the delta method. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote significance at 10, 5 and 1%
respectively. F shows the first-stage F-statistic.
Row 1 repeats the main results from Tables 1-7 for ease of comparison (N = 88, NT = 1099).
Row 2 excludes fixed eﬀects from estimation (N = 88, NT = 1099).
Row 3 constructs the endogenous aid variable in the second stage and the initial shares in donor budgets
on which the instrument is based after discarding all aid data in the years before a recipient country’s
independence (N = 81, NT = 1033).
Row 4 includes both aid and its first lag, instrumented by the current and one-period-lagged values of
the instrument; sample starts with 1974-76 (N = 80, NT = 978). F is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
F statistic.
Row 5 uses the final year values in each period for the dependent variables instead of the three-year
averages (N = 86, NT = 1065).
Row 6 excludes the first two periods (1971-73 and 1974-76) from estimation (N = 88, NT = 965).
Row 7 excludes the first three periods (1971-73, 1974-76 and 1977-79) from estimation (N = 88,
NT = 892).
Row 8 uses an instrument based on initial shares over 1960-73; sample starts with 1980-82 (N = 91,
NT = 919).
Row 9 uses an instrument based on initial shares over 1960-73; sample starts with 1983-85 (N = 91,
NT = 846).
Row 10 uses an instrument based on initial shares over 1960-76; sample starts with 1977-79 (N = 92,
NT = 1003).
Row 11 uses an instrument based on initial shares over 1960-76; sample starts with 1980-82 (N = 92,
NT = 929).
Row 12 uses an instrument based on initial shares over 1960-76; sample starts with 1983-85 (N = 92,
NT = 856).
The remaining entries in the table are variations on the treatment of delayed eﬀects
(rows 4 and 5), the exclusion of initial periods (rows 6 and 7), and the use of longer
time periods over which to measure the initial budget shares (rows 8-12). The results
for net imports are remarkably consistent across the various experiments, and the null
hypothesis of full absorption is never rejected. The results for total consumption are a
little more uneven: the point estimates are reasonably stable, but the standard errors
sometimes increase, so that the results are sometimes significant at conventional levels
and sometimes not. This is perhaps not surprising, given that some of these experiments
are asking a lot of the data when the sample size is reduced. As before, the increase
in net imports appears to come about by increased imports rather than a reduction in
exports.
We now summarize some other experiments. First, we examine whether the es-
timated eﬀects of aid are driven by distinct subgroups of countries, namely economies
where natural resources play a major role, and countries with unusually strong or weak
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institutions. To identify the aid recipients who rely on mineral exports, we use the
share in merchandise exports of fuel, ores and metals, and multiply this by the share
of merchandise exports in GDP. We then exclude the eleven countries where mineral
exports, averaged over the relevant time periods, exceed 30% of GDP: in descending
order, these are Gabon, Oman, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the Republic of the Congo, Libya,
Trinidad and Tobago, Nigeria, Angola, Yemen, and Zambia. In this reduced sample, we
continue to find strong eﬀects of aid on net imports and a significant eﬀect on imports,
while there is no evidence that exports are adversely aﬀected (results not reported). As
before, absorption seems to work through total consumption: the estimated eﬀect of
aid on total consumption is significant at the 5% level in the static CCE IV estimates,
although only at 15% in the dynamic case. The dynamic models suggest that aid may
also have a positive eﬀect on investment, whether estimated by FE IV or CCE IV.
To analyze subgroups linked to institutional quality, we take the average of the six
Worldwide Governance Indicators. These data are available bi-annually for 1996-2002,
and annually thereafter. For each aid recipient, we average the governance indicator
over all sample periods in which it is available and the recipient is in the sample. When
we drop the ten best-governed countries, we continue to find strong eﬀects of aid on
total consumption and on net imports, while dynamic models continue to suggest that
aid also promotes higher investment (results not reported). As before, there is evidence
of an increase in imports, while the estimated eﬀect on exports is insignificant. When
we instead drop the ten worst-governed countries, the results are similar. We still find
a strong eﬀect on net imports, and no evidence of an adverse eﬀect on exports. The
eﬀect on total consumption is significant at 10% in the CCE IV estimates of a static
model, but only at 18% in the dynamic case. In line with the previously-acknowledged
fragility of the results for investment, the eﬀect on investment is now insignificant.
We now return to the potential for spurious correlations. One way to see if output
plays a confounding role is to examine large changes in real GDP, perhaps arising from
economic crisis or civil war. If such events generate large swings in aid and expenditure
components relative to GDP, they could influence the within variation. In that case,
the eﬀects of aid might be identified mainly from extreme events, but responses to aid
may also be diﬀerent at those times. Since our interest is primarily in the eﬀects of aid
in ‘normal times’, we investigate what happens when we gradually eliminate countries
which sometimes exhibit rapid declines in real GDP (‘output collapses’).
For each country-period observation, we calculate the percentage change in real GDP
from the previous to the current three-year period. For a static model estimated by CCE
IV, Figure B.1 shows the evolution of the estimated eﬀect of aid as we progressively
drop the countries with the largest output collapses. Figure B.2 does the same for the
12
Figure B.1: Dropping countries with the largest relative fall in real GDP (static model)
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Note: Graphs show how the estimated eﬀects of aid (solid line) on household consumption (C),
government consumption (G), total consumption (C + G), gross capital formation (I), exports (X),
imports (M) and net imports (M − X) change when progressively dropping the countries with the
largest percentage declines in real GDP, based on CCE IV estimation of a static model. Dashed lines
indicate the 90% confidence interval. Horizontal axis shows the number of countries dropped. Graphs
constructed with coefplot for Stata (Jann, 2013).
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Figure B.2: Dropping countries with the largest relative fall in real GDP (dynamic
model)
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Note: See note Figure B.1. These graphs show the long-run eﬀects of aid (solid line) with 90% con-
fidence intervals (dashed lines) when progressively dropping the countries with the largest percentage
declines in real GDP, based on CCE IV estimation of a model that includes a lagged dependent variable.
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long-run eﬀect of aid estimated from a model with a lagged dependent variable. If the
impact of aid diﬀered in times of crisis, or earlier results were driven by large movements
in the denominator of the ratios, we would expect the estimated coeﬃcients to move
substantially. We find little evidence of this. The eﬀects on net imports are fairly stable
in the static and dynamic models, and the confidence intervals always exclude zero
and include unity. Arguably, compared to our earlier findings, the main diﬀerences are
the wider confidence intervals for the eﬀects of aid on household consumption, total
consumption and imports. The point estimates are reasonably stable, however.
The spurious correlation argument is less applicable once the variables have been
first-diﬀerenced. But we now investigate another approach, which is to work with an
approximation to (1) and (2). This will allow us to separate the eﬀects of GDP from
those of aid, by expressing the dependent variable in logarithms. Consider a version
with fixed eﬀects rather than common factors and a multiplicative error term:
Qit/Yit = [ηi + β (Ait/Yit)] exp(εit) (B.3)
We can assume both sides of this equation are strictly positive, the empirically relevant
case in what follows. If we take logarithms, we can write:
log (Qit/Yit) = log [1 + β (Ait/Yit) + (ηi − 1)] + εit (B.4)
Consider cases where β (Ait/Yit) + (ηi − 1) ≈ 0. Then we can use log(1 + x) ≈ x for
small x to arrive at an approximation:
log (Qit/Yit) ≈ β (Ait/Yit) + (ηi − 1) + εit (B.5)
This model can be estimated as before, now with redefined fixed eﬀects η′
i
= ηi − 1.
Given that the approximation is likely to work best if ηi is close to unity, we focus on
two dependent variables in particular: the ratio of total consumption to GDP and the
ratio of domestic absorption (C + I +G) to GDP. The latter can be seen as the mirror
image of the earlier results for net imports.
15
Table B.2: Log dependent variables
Row Model Without cross-sectional mean of log Y With cross-sectional mean of log Y
log (C + G) log (C + I + G) log (C + G) log (C + I + G)
1
Static
0.00693∗∗ 0.00923∗∗∗ 0.00243 0.00516
(0.00324) (0.00257) (0.00311) (0.00429)
F 19.21 17.71 15.74 15.08
Dyn.
0.00794∗ 0.0125∗∗∗ 0.00446 0.00534
(0.00471) (0.00445) (0.00418) (0.00540)
F 11.95 13.04 9.350 9.262
2
Static
0.0136∗ 0.00800∗ 0.0169 0.00321
(0.00746) (0.00475) (0.0110) (0.00926)
F 10.30 9.561 3.937 3.171
Dyn.
0.0141 0.00977∗ 0.0183 0.00325
(0.00871) (0.00570) (0.0126) (0.0106)
F 7.981 6.045 3.730 1.592
Note: The entries in this table show the long-run eﬀect of aid on the log of total consumption
(log (C + G)) and the log of domestic absorption (log (C + I + G)) in models with (“Dyn.”) and
without (“Static”) a lagged dependent variable. All variables expressed relative to GDP. CCE IV
estimation on three-year averages (1971-2012) using an instrument based on initial shares in donor
budgets over 1960-70. The first two columns control for log (Y ). The final two columns in addition
control for the cross-sectional mean of log (Y ), with country-specific coeﬃcients, and only include
countries with at least 7 time series observations. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered
by country, in brackets. Standard errors (SE) for long-run eﬀects based on the delta method. ∗, ∗∗,
and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. F shows the first-stage F-statistic.
Row 1 uses the full sample (N = 88, NT = 1099; when controlling for the cross-sectional mean of
log (Y ): N = 86, NT = 1087).
Row 2 removes outliers (N = 81, NT = 1004; when controlling for the cross-sectional mean of log (Y ):
N = 79, NT = 992).
This approach has a significant advantage. As a test of whether the correlations are
spurious, we can introduce a role for the logarithm of Yit as an explanatory variable.
This can be interpreted as a regression of, say, the logarithm of total consumption on
the logarithm of GDP, and the aid/GDP ratio in levels, in which case the concern about
spurious correlations with aid does not apply.34 In CCE and CCE IV estimates, we
could also include the cross-section mean of the logarithm of Yit with country-specific
coeﬃcients. For a number of reasons, we should expect this to work less well than our
main approach. It is based on an approximation, which in itself will weaken the estimated
models under our maintained assumptions, while the CCE case implies a large increase
34It might be asked why we do not work with a model which includes aid in logarithms as well. That
log-linear model would imply a multiplicative relationship in levels, which is hard to justify in terms
of economic theory. It would also have unconvincing implications: for example, if aid is close to zero,
then consumption will be predicted to be close to zero.
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in the number of parameters to estimate.
If our earlier results arose from spurious correlations, we should find that expressing
the dependent variable in logarithms, and controlling for the logarithm of GDP on the
right-hand-side, leads to diﬀerent findings. But it is clear from the first two columns of
estimates in Table B.2 that we continue to find eﬀects of aid on total consumption and
total absorption. The magnitudes of the coeﬃcients cannot be compared directly to our
earlier models, now that the dependent variable is in logarithms, but a simple calculation
indicates that the average marginal eﬀects remain similar to those previously reported.
The main qualification to the findings is that, if we also add the cross-section mean of the
logarithm of nominal GDP, with country-specific coeﬃcients, the instrument weakens,
and the estimated eﬀects become imprecise; this is natural given the large number of
parameters, but the signs of the eﬀects do not change. This is a far more stringent test
than is usual in the cross-country literature. To investigate it further might require a
switch to annual data, and a model with richer dynamics, but we leave this for future
work.
There are other ways to respond to the potential concern about spurious correlations,
such as including the reciprocal of nominal GDP as an additional explanatory variable.
The inclusion of the denominator of ratios is the approach suggested by Kronmal (1993)
in a cross-section setting, although it is tied to a particular data generating process. In
our case, including the reciprocal of nominal GDP will again increase the standard errors,
particularly in CCE estimates given the additional cross-section mean and associated
country-specific coeﬃcients, and the inclusion of the reciprocal of nominal GDP in the
first stage of 2SLS. But the results are generally quite similar to our baseline estimates;
see Table B.3. We continue to find significant eﬀects on net imports and consumption,
and little evidence for eﬀects on government consumption, investment and exports. In
some cases, the point estimates for the consumption eﬀects become larger, and the
associated confidence intervals are wider than before; in a few cases, the instrument
noticeably weakens. But the reciprocal of nominal GDP is often insignificant, especially
in CCE estimates.
Table B.3: Controlling for 1/Y
Row Model C G C+G I X M M-X
1
Static
0.708 -0.0583 0.662∗∗ 0.279 -0.0464 0.622∗∗∗ 1.085∗∗∗
(0.435) (0.150) (0.284) (0.252) (0.267) (0.210) (0.285)
F 18.18 14.99 19.84 14.67 30.69 29.27 18.14
Dyn.
0.856 -0.0566 0.775∗ 0.700∗ 0.346 1.115∗∗∗ 1.543∗∗∗
(0.655) (0.172) (0.436) (0.394) (0.402) (0.385) (0.513)
F 11.84 13.89 12.12 11.21 30.97 19.52 13.45
Continued on next page
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Table B.3 – continued from previous page
Row Model C G C+G I X M M-X
2
Static
1.583∗∗ -0.0706 1.282∗∗ -0.187 -0.128 0.308 0.981∗∗
(0.795) (0.315) (0.626) (0.478) (0.472) (0.390) (0.457)
F 9.665 12.58 9.033 8.418 11.12 13.20 8.509
Dyn.
1.766∗ -0.193 1.370∗ -0.0103 1.117 1.149∗ 1.347∗∗
(1.027) (0.436) (0.755) (0.649) (0.905) (0.696) (0.660)
F 8.599 10.75 6.999 6.179 9.434 10.44 5.168
3
Static
0.702 -0.0485 0.660∗∗ 0.279 0.00702 0.663∗∗∗ 1.085∗∗∗
(0.431) (0.147) (0.281) (0.246) (0.277) (0.216) (0.286)
F 18.54 14.79 21.04 15.19 30.01 29.17 18.91
Dyn.
0.851 -0.0481 0.773∗ 0.691∗ 0.387 1.124∗∗∗ 1.546∗∗∗
(0.639) (0.168) (0.425) (0.377) (0.420) (0.394) (0.512)
F 12.23 13.68 12.92 12.65 31.42 19.58 14.33
4
Static
1.570∗ -0.0485 1.273∗ -0.188 0.0363 0.370 0.963∗
(0.813) (0.289) (0.653) (0.482) (0.493) (0.424) (0.493)
F 12.61 13.23 11.51 10.85 10.37 13.71 10.14
Dyn.
1.730∗ -0.150 1.351∗ -0.0224 1.336 1.126 1.306∗
(1.045) (0.401) (0.785) (0.683) (0.947) (0.718) (0.704)
F 11.08 10.88 8.895 9.467 9.438 12.07 7.209
5
Static
0.692 0.0233 0.643 -0.0509 0.0958 0.499 1.007∗∗
(0.560) (0.113) (0.465) (0.392) (0.300) (0.504) (0.451)
F 12.65 9.983 15.12 7.590 16.25 6.817 13.06
Dyn.
0.838 0.00645 0.934 -0.117 0.409 0.829 1.318∗
(0.654) (0.126) (0.642) (0.515) (0.356) (0.580) (0.711)
F 7.699 8.707 8.491 8.250 13.37 5.812 9.979
6
Static
2.190∗∗ 0.0620 2.078∗∗ -1.021 -0.194 0.904 0.933∗
(0.915) (0.262) (0.889) (0.698) (0.530) (0.801) (0.493)
F 6.029 5.572 6.246 5.355 6.559 5.854 6.239
Dyn.
2.477∗ -0.0153 2.313∗∗ -1.108 0.795 1.377 1.169
(1.332) (0.290) (1.120) (1.027) (0.782) (1.011) (0.724)
F 3.757 7.970 3.802 3.210 6.181 5.508 3.878
Note: The entries in this table show the long-run eﬀect of aid on household consumption (C), govern-
ment consumption (G), total consumption (C + G), gross capital formation (I), exports (X), imports
(M) and net imports (M −X) in models with (“Dyn.”) and without (“Static”) a lagged dependent
variable. All variables expressed relative to GDP. CCE IV estimation on three-year averages (1971-2012)
using an instrument based on initial shares in donor budgets over 1960-70. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors, clustered by country, in brackets. Standard errors (SE) for the long-run eﬀects ob-
tained via the delta method. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. F
shows the first-stage F-statistic.
Row 1 repeats the main results from Tables 1-7 for ease of comparison (N = 88, NT = 1099).
Row 2 removes outliers, repeating row 9 of Table 8 (N = 81, NT = 1004).
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Row 3 controls for 1/Y in the full sample (N = 88, NT = 1099).
Row 4 controls for 1/Y in the sample without outliers (N = 81, NT = 1004).
Row 5 controls for 1/Y and its cross-sectional mean, allowing the latter to enter with country-specific
coeﬃcients, in the full sample. Only countries with at least 7 time series observations are included
(N = 86, NT = 1087).
Row 6 controls for 1/Y and its cross-sectional mean, allowing the latter to enter with country-specific
coeﬃcients, in the sample without outliers. Only countries with at least 7 time series observations are
included (N = 79, NT = 992).
In summary, although we have implemented a battery of tests that are far more
stringent than is usual in the literature, our overall findings seem to hold up well. The
result that aid increases net imports around one-for-one emerges repeatedly, so that
the null of full absorption is not rejected. In terms of channels, there is some variation
in the results, which is not surprising when the number of parameters is increased or
the sample size reduced. Nevertheless, most of the estimated models indicate that
absorption is taking place primarily through increases in total consumption. Also in line
with our main findings, the evidence tends to suggest that the increase in net imports is
achieved by increased imports rather than a reduction in exports, so we do not uncover
any evidence of Dutch Disease.
B.6 List of donors
Table B.4 lists the 29 donors that contribute to the instrument values of recipient
countries in the sample, alongside their average annual share in world aid over the
period 1960-2012 and their median Herfindahl-Hirschman (HH) index over the sample
period (1971-2012). Donors are listed in descending order of their share in world aid.
References
Brock, Philip L. (1996). International transfers, the relative price of nontraded goods,
and the current account. Canadian Journal of Economics, 29, 163-80.
Brock, Philip L. and Turnovsky, Stephen J. (1994). The dependent-economy model
with both traded and nontraded capital goods. Review of International Economics,
2(3), 306-25.
Greenstone, M., Mas, A., and Nguyen, H.-L. (2015). Do credit market shocks aﬀect
the real economy? Quasi-experimental evidence from the Great Recession and ‘Normal’
economic times. Working paper, University of Chicago, September.
19
Table B.4: List of donors that contribute to the instrument
Donor Share in world aid Median HH index
United States 25.78 0.010
Japan 9.00 0.066
France 7.99 0.042
Germany 7.46 0.038
IDA 7.43 0.071
EU Institutions 6.52 0.031
United Kingdom 4.72 0.052
Netherlands 2.58 0.042
Canada 2.29 0.045
Australia 2.02 0.165
Italy 1.72 0.112
Other Multilaterals 1.63 0.525
Kuwait 1.60 0.132
WFP 1.59 0.044
Sweden 1.58 0.058
UNDP 1.52 0.017
Other donor countries 1.24 0.344
Belgium 1.22 0.139
AsDB Special Funds 1.19 0.176
IDB Sp.Fund 1.14 0.156
Norway 1.03 0.057
Denmark 0.94 0.061
UNICEF 0.82 0.037
UNHCR 0.79 0.080
Switzerland 0.65 0.034
Austria 0.53 0.204
UNTA 0.40 0.013
Portugal 0.34 0.284
UNRWA 0.30 0.369
Note: Share in world aid is the average annual share of the donor in total world aid over the period
1960-2012. Median HH index is the median Herfindahl-Hirschman index of the donor over the sample
period (1971-2012). For details on the construction of the HH index, see Figure 1 and the surrounding
text in the paper.
20
Jann, Ben (2013). coefplot: Stata module to plot regression coeﬃcients and other
results. http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s457686.html.
Turnovsky, Stephen J. (1997). International Macroeconomic Dynamics. MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA.
21
